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u.s. Navy surface combatant requirements progressively 
dropped from 238 in 1988 to 116 in 1998. This reduction 
was part of the U. s. military transformation in the post-
Cold War period. This thesis examined the maj or factors 
that influenced the change in surface combatant planning 
since 1990, i.e., budget agreements, naval doctrine, OPNAV 
reorganization, and Defense reviews. Data sources included 
books, periodicals, maj or force structure reviews, naval 
strategy papers, budgetary reports, and interviews. The 
major conclusion is that constrained fiscal resources had 
the most dramatic effect on the surface combatant fleet. 
To adapt to the drop in O&M and procurement funding, the 
Navy has reduced costs by decommissioning older ships, 
slowing shipbuilding rates, shifting to multiyear 
contracts, and focusing on life cycle expenses. The next 
scheduled surface combatant program, 00-21, will compete 
against other shipbuilding programs due to proj ections of 
relatively flat Defense budgets. The shift to littoral 
warfare has also shaped the surface combatant force, 
changing doctrine and weapon system emphasis. 
v 
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The Reagan Administration had a goal of a 600 ship 
Navy to fight the Cold War against a known enemy, the 
Soviet Union. The 600 ship Navy was to contain 238 surface 
combatants [Ref. 1, p. 31], composed of cruisers, 
destroyers and frigates. In the event of a conflict with 
the Soviets, the surface combatants were to defend carrier 
and amphibious battle groups against Soviet aircraft, 
missiles and nuclear submarines. 
Since the end of the Cold War, naval forces have been 
reduced significantly. For surface combatants, the Navy's 
planned force level has fallen from the fiscal year 1988 
high of 238 to 116 in fiscal year 1998 [Ref. 2, p. 29]. 
This is due to the changes in the international security 
environment and U.S. efforts to bring deficit spending 
under control. 
When the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union 
broke up, the world changed. In 1990, President Bush 
acknowledged the "New World Order H and announced that U.S. 
Defense policy would shift towards major regional conflicts 
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[Ref. 1, p. 31]. The u.s. military responded to the 
challenge of fighting major regional conflicts by 
emphasizing j oint warfare doctrine. This doctrine is to 
integrate all of the services into warfighting strategies 
[Ref. 3]. 
For surface combatants, the shift in policy has meant 
a whole new maritime strategy. Open ocean warfare became a 
mission of the past. Surface combatants were to be 
assigned a new mission to participate in maj or regional 
conflicts. The new mission was littoral warfare, described 
in the Navy's white paper " ... From the Sea" in 1992 [Ref. 4]. 
Surface combatants would be responsible for securing the 
littoral area in a major regional conflict. The joint 
requirements of littoral warfare have shaped surface 
combatant force level planning, weapon systems and future 
ship programs. 
On January 1, 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral F. B. Kelso, reorganized the Navy's administrative 
staff (OPNAV) to promote jointness within the naval warfare 
communities. The Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations for 
Submarine Warfare (OP-02), Surface Warfare (OP-03) and Air 
Warfare (OP-05), the Deputy Chief of Staff for Naval 
Warfare (OP-07) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Navy 
2 
Program Planning (OP-08) were merged into one staff under 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare 
Requirements and Assessments (N8) [Ref. 5, p. 2]. The 
warfare communities no longer reported directly to the Vice 
Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), but instead to N8 who 
then reported to the VCNO. Warfare communi ties were now 
r~quired to justify their programs to N8 in terms of their 
contributions to certain mission areas. The reorganization 
was a major change for surface combatant planning. 
Due to the shift in strategies, weapon systems and 
future ship programs have. been designed with littoral 
warfare and j oint operations in mind. The Navy has been 
actively pursuing littoral warfare improvements in theater 
ballistic missile Defense, Tomahawk strike capabilities, 
naval surface fire support and mine warfare 
countermeasures. The only new surface combatant planned 
for the next century is 00-21, the land attack destroyer. 
One of this destroyer's proposed capabilities is to stop a 
land force's advancement by itself [Ref. 6, p. 2]. Prior 
to the 1990s, surface combatants were never expected to 
exercise this kind of influence on the littoral 
battlespace. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, another change has 
affected surface combatant planning. The federal government 
shifted its budgetary tactics for deficit reduction. To 
reduce the federal budget deficit, President Bush and 
Congress abandoned the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit 
controls and passed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
of 1990. OBRA 1990 promised to save $482 billion in 
spending over the next five years [Ref. 7, p. 13]. The 
savings were due in part to limits on discretionary 
spending authority and outlays. For fiscal years 1991-93, 
each discretionary spending category, Defense, domestic and 
international, had its own spending limit and the overall 
discretionary budget had a total limit. In fiscal years 
1994-95, the discretionary budgets were given just one 
overall spending limit. 
In 1993, President Clinton and Congress passed another 
reconciliation act extending the discretionary spending 
limits until 1998. OBRA 1993 promised to save an 
additional $433 billion from fiscal years 1994 to 1998 
[Ref. 7, p. 15]. With the goal of balancing the budget by 
fiscal year 2002, President Clinton and Congress passed the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. This agreement extended the 
discretionary spending limits through fiscal years 1998 to 
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2002 and promised to save $204 billion during that period 
[Re f. 8, p. 1118]. 
The majority of discretionary savings came from limits 
on Defense spending [Ref. 9, Table 8-2]. The spending 
limi ts of the BEA continued a negative real growth trend 
for Defense that began in 1985 [Ref. 10, p. 35]. These 
budget agreements translated into a real (inflation 
adjusted) decline of 30 percent for the Department of 
Defense (000) total obligational authority (TOA) between 
1989 and 1998. Over the same period, procurement dropped 47 
percent, operations and maintenance 15 percent, and 
research and development 21 percent [Ref. 11, Table 6-1]. 
The Navy recognized that resources would be reduced 
and began shrinking the fleet at the end of the Cold War. 
The surface warfare community decommissioned all of its old 
steam cruisers, destroyers and frigates. In need of more 
savings from the fleet, modernization programs were 
reevaluated and modified. The originally planned 
procurement rate for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers was 
five to six per year [Ref. 12, p. 11]. In 1996, only two 
were purchased [Ref. 1, p. 44] and the planned rate for 
fiscal years 1999-2003 dropped to thre~ per year [Ref. 13]. 
The Arsenal Ship, the newest and most revolutionary ship 
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design since the ballistic missile submarine, was cancelled 
due to budget constraints in late 1997 [Ref. 14, p. 2]. 
These two major changes, the end of the Cold War and 
tight limits on discretionary spending, have shaped surface 
combatant planning during the 1990s. The 000 has reflected 
these changes in the "Base Force H (1990), "Bottom-Up 
Review H (1993) and "Quadrennial Defense Review H (1997). 
These documents explain the changes in U. s. strategy and 
the subsequent reduction of military forces to meet the new 
requirements. 
For surface combatants, this has meant a shift in 
warfare missions and a reduction in force levels. 
Throughout this decade of transition, the surface warfare 
community has decommissioned large numbers of ships, 
evaluated modernization plans for old ships, reviewed force 
efficiency strategies, reduced procurement rates and 
changed designs for future ships to meet changing 000 force 
structures and policies. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The obj ecti ve of this thesis is to promote a better 
understanding of the post-Cold War period and the change in 
surface combatant planning. This has been accomplished by 
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examining the major strategic and budgetary influences on 
surface combatants. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the most important factors determining the 
force level for u.s. Navy surface combatants since the end 
of the Cold War? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What trends are observed in surface combatant 
force levels since the end of the Cold War? 
b. How have the major deficit reduction agreements of 
the 1990s affected the surface combatant 
modernization budget? 
c. How have the Department of Defense "Base Force" 
(1990) , "Bottom-Up Review" (1993) and the 
"Quadrennial Defense Review" (1997) shaped the 
surface combatant force? 
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d. How did the OPNAV staff reorganization in 1993 
change budgeting for surface combatants? 
e. How has Navy doctrine, i. e., the shift from open 
ocean warfare to littoral warfare, changed surface 
combatant planning? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of the research is limited to the 
examination of the surface combatant force level changes. 
The research focuses on the budgeted surface combatant 
force levels and the major factors that determined the 
numbers. The period studied is from 1990 through 1998. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Budgetary reports, documents on strategy and doctrine, 
periodicals and studies were reviewed and analyzed for 
information on surface combatant force levels. Interviews 
wi th OPNAV personnel were conducted to obtain additional 
information on the OPNAV reorganization, program planning, 
and surface combatants. These interviews were with Vice 
Admiral Philip Quast (Ret. ), former Director of Surface 
Warfare Division (N8 6), Commander J. D. Moore, Program and 
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Budgeting Branch (N860) and Captain Linda Hutton, Executive 
Assistant for Assessment Division (N81). 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II explains the federal budget deficit and the 
impact of budget agreements in the 1990s on Defense 
spending and, in turn, funding for surface combatants. 
Chapter III reviews the post-Cold War change in naval 
doctrine. The first part of the chapter focuses on the 
major strategy papers that demonstrated the shift in 
emphasis from planning war at sea toward supporting joint 
operations on land from the sea. To illustrate naval 
strategy before the transition, "The Maritime Strategy" 
(1986) is explained, including the Soviet threat it was to 
counter in the 1980s. Then "The Way Ahead" (1991) is 
examined to discuss the doctrinal transition due to the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, " ... From the Sea" 
(1992) and "Forward ... From the Sea" (1994) are reviewed to 
show the direction of present naval strategy. The second 
part focuses on the direction of surface combatants due to 
the new naval strategy. 
The surface combatant community itself has experienced 
changes during the 1990s that have affected force planning. 
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Chapter IV explains the 1993 administrative staff 
reorganization of the CNO and the subsequent change to the 
programming process. The effect of these changes is then 
examined in relation to the first budget after the 
reorganization, fiscal year 1994, and surface combatant 
planning. In addition, the development of a new assessment 
process in 1998, Integrated Warfare Architectures, is 
explained, 
combatants. 
including the implications for surface 
Chapter V explains the three major 000 reviews in the 
1990s; "Base Force" (1990) ,"Bottom-Up Review" (1993), and 
"Quadrennial Defense Review" (1997). The reviews explain 
DoD's attempt to match Defense policy and surface combatant 
resources. The National Defense Panel, an independent, 
non-partisan group, critiqued the "Quadrennial Defense 
Review" (QDR). Their report and the fiscal year 1999 
Defense budget, the latest budget since the QDR, are also 
explained in this chapter. Finally, the effects of these 
reviews on the entire fleet and surface combatants are 
discussed. 
The final chapter summarizes the major changes that 
have influenced surface combatant planning. This summary 
divides the conclusions into factors that shaped the 
10 
present force and factors that will influence the future 
force. The chapter concludes with recommendations for 
further research. 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis examines surface combatant force levels in 
the· 1990s and the factors that changed them. The thesis 
promotes a better understanding of the new maritime 
strategy, the budgetary process and the present surface 
combatant force level. 
11 
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II. 'l'HE DEFICI'l' AND 'l'HE DEFENSE BUDGE'l' 
A. IN'l'RODUC'l' ION 
This chapter explains the federal budget deficit and 
the impact of budget agreements in the 1990s on Defense 
spending and, in turn, surface combatants. Al though the 
demise of the Soviet threat, not the budget, changed naval 
strategy, this chapter's focus is the fiscal restrictions 
that played a vi tal role in shaping force structure. The 
first part of the chapter gives a historical overview of 
the deficit, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit 
reduction acts, the Budget Enforcement Acts (BEA) of 1990 
and 1993, and the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 1997. The 
emphasis is on the reduction of Defense spending due to the 
budget limits imposed by Congress and the President. The 
second part of the chapter explains the impact of those 
agreements on the Navy budget and surface combatant force 
planning. 
B. DEFICI'l' 
Since 1946, federal expenditures have exceeded 
revenues 43 out of 52 years, and every year beginning in 
1970 (until 1998). These deficits were a result of 
13 
numerous events, including the growth of entitlement 
spending, tax policies, Cold War military expenditures and 
unexpected economic slowdowns. From the end of World War 
II through the mid-1970s, policy makers did not consider 
the budget deficits a maj or concern. From 1947 to 1974, 
the federal government's deficits averaged less than one 
percent of GOP. [Ref. 7, p. 4] 
Starting in the mid-1970s, deficits began to increase 
sharply. From 1975 to 1985, deficits averaged 3.6 percent 
of GOP and the gross federal debt more than tripled. As a 
percentage of GOP, the debt was closing in on World War II 
proportions. [Ref. 9, Tables 1.3 and 7.1] 
c. GRAMM-RUDMANN-HOLLINGS 
By the 1980s, deficits had become symbols of 
government failure. The existing budget process, 
established by the Congressional Budget Impoundment and 
Control Act of 1974, proved incapable of forcing Congress 
and the president to effectively reduce the deficit [Ref. 
7, p. 12]. In 1985, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Oefici t Control Act to combat the deficit 
problem. The Act is better known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 
after the names of its three original sponsors, Senators 
14 
Phil Gramm (R-TX), Warren Rudman 
Hollings (D-SC) [Ref. 15, p. 22]. 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH I) 
(R-NH), and Ernest 
established fixed 
deficit targets for six years. Each year the targets were 
reduced until the budget was to be balanced in the sixth 
year. The GRH I deficit targets are in Table 2.1. 
If the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates 
indicated that Congress was going to exceed the GRH deficit 
targets by more than $10 billion, a sequester was required. 
Sequestration cut eligible federal spending by whatever 
amount was needed to reach the maximum deficit target 
amount, if the President and Congress were unable or 
unwilling to do so on their own [Ref. 15, p. 23]. Half of 
the amount was to come from Defense spending and the other 
half from eligible non-defense spending. 
With deficit estimates significantly above the GRH 
maximum deficit targets and sequestration looming in 1987, 
Congress revised the deficit targets in the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act. The 1987 
Reaffirmation Act is commonly known as GRH II and its 
targets are also listed in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: GRH I and II Deficit Targets for FY86-92 (In 
Billions of Dollars). From Ref. 15. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GRH I 172 144 108 72 36 0 
GRH II 144 136 100 64 28 
In 1990, the ineffectiveness of GRH I and II deficit 
targets reached a peak with President Bush's fiscal 1991 
budget. In January, the budget projected a fiscal 1991 
baseline deficit of $101 billion, exceeding the GRH II 1991 
target by $37 billion. By October, the proj ected deficit 
had risen to $295 billion, exceeding the target by $231 
billion. [Ref. 15, p. 26] Sequestration would require an 
unrealistic 34.5 percent cut in Defense spending and a 31.6 
percent cut in non-defense spending [Ref. 7, p. 13]. 
GRH I and II procedures failed to meet their objective 
of balancing the budget. Their sanctions were too extreme 
and lacked credibility. Sequestration was unfair in 
targeting discretionary spending to balance the budget. 
From 1985 to 1990, Defense spending dropped seven percent 
in real growth while mandatory spending grew 16 percent 
[Ref. 9, Table 8-2]. The GRH procedures were a short-term 
solution for a long-term problem. [Ref. 7, p. 13] 
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D. BUDGET AGREEMENTS OF THE 1990s 
Wi th catastrophic cuts in discretionary spending 
required under GRH, President Bush and Congress modified 
their deficit reduction approach with the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990. Under the new Budget 
Enforcement Act (BEA) procedures, 
no longer the major goal; 
reducing the deficit was 
limiting spending and 
guaranteeing the baseline level of revenues were the budget 
process' primary goal [Ref. 15, p.23]. 
OBRA 1990 promised to save $482 billion in spending 
over five years. The savings were due in part to limits on 
discretionary spending authority and outlays. For fiscal 
years 1991-93, each discretionary expenditure category --
Defense, domestic and international-- had its own spending 
limit and the overall discretionary budget had a total 
limit. The disaggegation of discretionary spending into 
three categories was accompanied by so-called "firewalls." 
This ensured that any spending below the caps in one area 
could not be applied to offset increased spending in 
another [Ref. 16, p. 42]. If spending for any category 
exceeded its limit, sequestration would be confined to the 
offending account [Ref. 10, p. 29]. In fiscal years 1994-
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95, discretionary spending was given just one overall 
spending limit. Table 2.2 displays the Defense and total 
discretionary spending limits enacted by BEA 1990. 
Table 2.2: BEA of 
Discretionary Spending 
Dollars). Ref. 17. 
1990 National Defense 
Limits FY9l-95 (In 
and Total 
Billions of 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Defense 
Budget Authority 332.9 305.3 289.7 
Outlays 330.8 310.3 298.9 
Total Discretionary 
Budget Authority 537.1 536.7 535.3 525.2 519.5 
Outlays 551. 6 545.6 550.2 547.6 547.1 
The spending limits were set at levels below the 
conventional baseline for discretionary spending, i.e., the 
previous year's level plus inflation [Ref. 18, p. 67]. 
These spending limits were adjusted each year with the new 
budget submission to take into account changes in the 
economy and in technical concepts and definitions affecting 
the budget [Ref. 16, p. 41]. 
To Congress and President Bush's surprise, the 
enactment of the largest deficit reduction package was 
followed by the largest nominal deficits in 1991, 1992 and 
1993 [Ref. 7, p. 14]. In 1993, the newly elected President 
Clinton and 103rd Congress passed the Omnibus Budget 
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Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993). This act extended 
the overall discretionary spending limits until 1998 and 
promised to save an additional $433 billion over five 
years. Table 2.3 contains the total discretionary spending 
limits enacted by OBRA 1993. 
OBRA 1990 and 1993 did not include actions requiring a 
balanced budget. However, with passage of the Bipartisan 
Budget Agreement of 1997, President Clinton and Congress 
hoped to achieve balance by 2002. The new agreement 
extended discretionary limits on Defense and non-defense 
and created a new discretionary spending ·cap for violent 
crime spending in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. For fiscal 
year 2000, there are limits on discretionary and violent 
crime spending. For fiscal years 2001-2, only a single cap 
on overall discretionary spending remains. [Ref. 19, p. 
263] The agreement proj ected a balanced budget by fiscal 
year 2002. The agreement's limits for Defense and total 
discretionary spending are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 2.3: BEA of 1993 and Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 
1997 Defense and Total Discretionary Spending L~its FY94-
02 (Billions of Dollars). Ref 19. 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Defense 
Budget 268.6 271. 6 275.5 282 289.8 
Authority 
Outlays 267 266.6 269 270.6 273.2 
Total Discretionary 
Budget 525.1 511 526.7 539.7 528 561.1 565.9 571. 3 581 
Authority 
Outlays 547.6 548.6 552.7 553.7 557.6 560.9 564.7 564.1 560.3 
Driven by the need to reduce spending in the name of 
deficit reduction, and given the opportunity to cut Defense 
spending after the Cold War, Congress and the President 
have used the spending caps to reduce discretionary outlays 
by 13 percent after inflation between 1989 and 1998. As a 
percentage of federal outlays, discretionary spending was 
reduced from 42.4 percent to 33 percent of the budget. As 
a percentage of· GOP, discretionary spending fell 2.5 
percent. However, within the reductions of the 
discretionary spending category, domestic outlays actually 
rose 18 percent, while Defense dropped 32 percent after 
inflation. [Ref. 9, Tables 8-2 and 8-4] 
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E. THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
At the height of the Reagan military build-up in 1985, 
Defense TOA was $403.3 billion (FY99 dollars). The 1998 
TOA was $262.3 billion (FY99 dollars), a 35 percent drop 
from 1985. For fiscal years 1992-94, the Defense budget 
lost on average of nine percent of its spending authority 
per year. [Ref. 11, Table 6-1] Due to the end of the Cold 
War, legislators looked for a "peace dividend" and Defense 
budgets sustained the majority of the cuts in discretionary 
spending intended to reduce the deficit [Ref. 20, p. 184]. 
Measured as a share of total government spending, 
Defense spending had been on a downward trend since the 
middle of the century. The Defense share of the budget 
soared to almost 90 percent during WWII. Except for the 
Korean War, the Defense share had been on a steady decline. 
The Vietnam War and Reagan Defense build-up slowed, but did 
not alter the reshaping of federal budget policy away from 
Defense toward non-defense purposes. [Ref. 21, p.7] 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 undercut the centrality 
the Defense budget had enjoyed under the Reagan 
Administration. The end of the Cold War marked the growing 
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consensus that Defense policy should be subordinated to 
deficit control. [Ref. 21, p. 12] 
The post-Cold War trend in Defense spending began in 
1990, when President Bush announced the Base Force. The 
Base Force's 25 percent active force level reduction was to 
save $175 billion in budget authority from fiscal years 
1992-96 [Ref. 21, p. 15]. With the creation of the Russian 
Commonwealth, Congress and the President sought further 
budgetary savings and appropriated below the agreed upon 
Defense discretionary limits [Ref. 18, p. 67]. In 1993, 
the new Clinton Administration accelerated the downward 
trend in Defense spending in the hope of expanding the 
"peace dividend" [Ref. 21, p. 16]. 
The "peace dividend" of the post-Cold War period was 
transformed into Defense spending limits to reduce the 
budget deficit. During the first three years of the 
separate spending limits, all deficit reduction from 
discretionary spending cuts came from the Defense budget. 
Defense spending accounted for $19.5 billion, or 82 
percent, of a total of $23.8 billion in discretionary 
savings beyond what was required by the BEA caps. [Ref. 18, 
p. 67] 
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From 1989 to 1998, these budgetary limits dropped 
Defense spending from 26.6 percent to 15.9 percent of 
federal outlays. As a percentage of GDP, Defense outlays 
declined from 5. 7 percent to 3.2 percent. [Ref. 9, Tables 
8-3 and 8-4] For this period, Defense spending shrank 30 
percent considering inflation. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
illustrate the trends in discretionary and Defense budget 
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Figure 2.1: FY9l-98 Discretionary and Defense Budget 
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Figure 2.2: FY91-98 Discretionary and Defense Outlays (FY92 
Dollars). Ref. 9, Table 8-7. 
Discretionary spending under the BEA was structured to 
redistribute resources to perceived domestic underfunding. 
Due to the BEA spending limits, domestic spending rose from 
34 percent to 48 percent of discretionary outlays. For the 
same period, Defense shrank from 62 percent to 48 percent 
of discretionary outlays. For fiscal years 1998-2003, 
however, the 1997 Balanced Budget Agreement ended the 
redistribution of funding and maintains an almost equal 
percentage of discretionary outlays for the two categories. 
[Ref. 9] 
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F. THE NAVY BUDGET 
President Reagan's military build-up established the 
goal of a 600-ship Navy. In "The Maritime Strategy," CNO 
Admiral James D. Watkins stated that strategy drives the 
entire budget process and the resulting procurement and 
research and development decisions [Ref. 22, p. 16]. In 
1986, Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman asserted that 
the 600-ship Navy was affordable and that "we can maintain 
the size and the current mix of our force through the rest 
of this century with a 3 percent growth budget" [Ref. 23, 
p. 40]. 
The Navy's six year budget strategy is summarized in 
its Program Obj ecti ves Memorandum (POM). Navy POMs for 
fiscal years 1984 to 1990 reflected the optimism of a 600-
ship Navy. However, due to the reprioritization of federal 
budget deficit reduction, Navy POMs differed significantly 
from actual funding. After the BEA of 1990, the 1992 and 
1994 POMs planned for at least zero growth but actual 
funding was at a considerably lower rate. Figure 2.3 
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Figure 2.3: FY84-94 Historical Trends between Navy PONs and 
actual funding. Ref. 24. 
Adjusted for inflation, the Navy's TOA declined 34 
percent from 1989 to 1998 due to Defense spending 
reductions. During this period, the Navy suffered an 
average real growth of negative 4. 7 percent per year. [Ref. 
11, Table 6-3] Figure 2.4 shows Defense and Navy TOA 
trends from 1989 to 1998. 
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Figure 2.4: FY89-98 Defense and Navy TOA (FY99 Dollars). 
Ref. 11, Table 6-3. 
The Navy's spending categories were reduced 
dramatically in this constricted financial environment. By 
fiscal year 1998, operations and maintenance (O&M) dropped 
30 percent, procurement 49 percent, and research and 
development (RDT&E) 31 percent [Ref. 11, Table 6-17J. 
Figure 2.5 shows the TOA trends for O&M, procurement, and 
RDT&E for fiscal years 1989-98. 
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Figure 2.5: FY89-98 Navy TOA for O&M, Procurement, and 
RDT&E (FY99 Dollars). Ref. 11, Table 6-17. 
Since the agreement on the discretionary spending 
limits in 1990, the Navy, on average, lost 3.6 percent in 
O&M, 6.4 percent in procurement, and 3.9 percent in RDT&E 
per year. Procurement experienced the sharpest decline 
during fiscal years 1991-94, averaging a negative 18.4 
percent real growth. [Ref. 11, Table 6-17] The procurement 
and RDT&E declines are due partly to the migration of funds 
to cover O&M shortfalls [Ref. 25, p. 1-1]. 
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G. SURFACE COMBATANTS 
The dramatic reductions in O&M, procurement and RDT&E 
curtailed plans for 238 surface combatants for the 600-ship 
Navy. For surface combatants, the Navy's constrained 
budgets translated into early decommissioning of ships, 
reducing new ship procurement rates and reconfiguration of 
new ship programs. 
1. Operations 
To decrease annual operating costs, the Navy 
accelerated the decommissioning of surface combatants in 
1989 [Ref. 26, p. 11]. The official service life for 
cruisers and destroyers is 40 years, for frigates 35 years. 
[Re f . 1, p. 49] The Navy decommissioned ships before the 
end of their service lives and, for some, after receiving 
expensive upgrades. 
a. Steam-Powered Combatants 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Navy had 
invested millions in modernizing the Leahy and Belknap-
class cruisers with the New Threat Upgrade (NTU). NTU 
modernized their air/surface search and fire control 
radars, improved their weapons direction and missile fire 
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control, converted their MK 10 and MK 26 missile launchers 
from analog to digital systems and installed SYS 2 
Integrated Automatic Target Detection and Tracking System 
(IADT) [Re f. 27]. 
Almost immediately after their modernization, the 
Navy decommissioned the Leahy and Belknap-class cruisers. 
In addition to the cruisers, the Navy decommissioned ships 
closer to the end of their service lives, e.g., the Charles 
F. Adams and Coontz-class destroyers and the Knox-class 
. frigates. Table 2.4 lists the number of surface combatants 
decommissioned, their time in service, age or average age 
at decommissioning, and whether they received NTU during 
the 1990s. 
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Table 2.4: Surface Combatants Decommissioned After the Cold 
War. Ref. 26 and 27. 
Class Ships Years Years Age or 
Commissioned Decommissioned Average Age 
Cruisers 
Long Beach 1 1961 1994 33 
Bainbridge 1 1962 1996 34 
Leahy 9 1962-64 1993-95 31 
Belknap 9 1964-67 1993-95 30 
Truxton 1 1967 1995 28 
California 2 1974-75 1998 23 
Virgina 4 1976-80 1993-97 28 
Destroyers 
Coontz 8 1959-61 1990-93 32 
Charles F. 16 1960-64 1991-93 30 
Adams 
Spruance 7 1975-77 1999 23 
Kidd 4 1981-82 1998-99 16 
Frigates 
Oliver 17 1976-81 1995-99 19 
Hazard Perry 
Knox 46 1969-74 1991-94 20 
Bronstein 2 1963 1990 27 
Glover 1 1965 1993 28 
*Belknap never received NTU, the remainder of the class 
did. 
**Arkansas and Texas never received NTU. 







Beginning in 1995, the Navy began decommissioning 
some of the less capable gas turbine frigates and 
destroyers to reduce operating costs. Between fiscal 
years 1995-99, almost half of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class 
frigates will be decommissioned or placed into the naval 
reserve force [Ref. 28 and 29 p. 8]. The four Kidd-class 
destroyers began decommissioning in 1998. The seven non-
31 
Vertical Launching System (VLS) Spruance-class destroyers 
will leave the service in fiscal year 1999. [Ref. 30] 
c. Nuclear-Powered Combatants 
By the end of fiscal year 1998, the last of the 
expensive nuclear cruisers was removed from service. Each 
one cost $38.8 million annually to man, operate, and 
maintain, compared to $29.5 million for a Ticonderoga-class 
cruiser [Ref. 31, p. 4]. The Navy had concluded that the 
nuclear cruisers were too costly to operate and modernize 
[Ref. 32]. 
Most of the nuclear cruisers went through an 
extensive modernization program during the early 1990s. 
The entire California and two of the four Virginia-class 
cruisers completed modernization with NTU [Ref. 27]. All 
four of the Virginia-class cruisers either began or were 
scheduled to begin nuclear refueling. Both California-
class cruisers completed a $425 million refueli~g in 1992 




While the older ships were 
recapi talization of the surface combatant 
deactivated, 
force was 
delayed. In the 1990s, only two classes of surface 
combatants were built, Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Since the last 
Ticonderoga-class cruisers were purchased in fiscal year 
1989, the program was not slowed by the discretionary 
spending limits of the 1990~. 
The Ticonderoga-class cruisers will receive the 
Aegis Cruiser Conversion upgrade between fiscal years 2001 
and 2005. The upgrade consists of littoral warfare and 
"smart ship" modifications to extend the cruisers' useful 
life. The conversion plan will delay the requirement to 
develop the second generation 21st century combatant, CG-21, 
until 2015. This delay will enable an affordable 
completion of a 32 ship DD-21 procurement. [Ref. 34, p. 26] 
b. Destroyers 
The budget austerity of the 1990s did have an 
effect on the procurement rate for Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers. In 1982, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman 
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planned on purchasing 63 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, 
beginning with the lead ship in fiscal year 1985, a one 
year hiatus in fiscal year 1986, three ships in 1987, and 
finally settling into a five ship per year program 
beginning in fiscal year 1988 [Ref. 35, p. 85]. According 
to the plan, the last Arleigh Burke-class destoyers would 
have been purchased in fiscal year 1999 and delivered in 
2004. 
Pressures from Congress and within the Department 
of the Navy (DoN) to economize forced the Navy to stretch 
out the Arleigh Burke acquisition program. In 1996, only 
two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers were purchased, and in 
fiscal years 1999-2003, the Navy only plans to buy three 
per year [Ref. 1, p. 13 and Ref. 13]. Table 2.5 contains 
the number of Arleigh Burke-class detroyers purchased and 
planned through 2003. 
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Table 2.5: Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyer Procurement FY85-
03. Ref. 1, p. 44, and Ref. 12, p. 10. 
FY 85 86 87 88 89 90 
Quantity 1 0 2 0 5 5 
FY 91 92 93 94 95 96 
Quantity 4 5 4 3 3 2 
FY 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Quantity 4 4 3 3* 3* 3* 3* 
* FY99 Budget Planned Procurement. 
The surface combatant industrial base and 
concerned legislators complained about the unstable Arleigh 
Burke program. In 1998, to save costs and promote a stable 
industrial base, the Navy implemented a four year multi-
year contract for 14 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The 
contract is proj ected to save up to $1.4 billion during 
fiscal years 1998-2001. The contract utilizes a long-term 
acquisition strategy that lowers costs, reduces disruptions 
from hiring and layoff cycles, level-loads employment, and 
encourages capital investment in the surface combatant 
industrial base. [Ref. 36] 
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3. New Ship Research and Development 
a. The Arsenal Ship 
The Navy's reduced resources significantly 
altered the search for new surface combatant programs. The 
lack of funding for RDT&E culminated in the cancellation of 
the Arsenal Ship development. In August 1997, the Navy 
informed Congress that $85 million was needed for program 
continuation. The fiscal year 1998 Defense Authorization 
Bill only provided $35 million for development. In 
December 1997, the Arsenal Ship program was cancelled due 
to lack of funding and other budget priorities. [Ref. 14, 
p. 2] 
The Arsenal Ship was to have been the first 
revolutionary ship design since the ballistic submarine. 
The Arsenal Ship was going to be a relatively low-cost 
surface combatant, carrying about 500 precision guided 
missiles. It was to be forward deployed for extended 
periods of time to the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, 
and the Western Pacific [Ref. 37, p. 13]. There were to be 
six Arsenal Ships, keeping a total of at least three and 
possibly as many as five, on station in distant operating 
areas at anyone time. Normally, the Navy must maintain 
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four to seven combat ships of a given type to keep one ship 
of that type on station in a distant operating area [Ref. 
37, p. 17]. The Arsenal Ship would have changed the 
planning for overseas presence requirements. 
b. The 218t Century Land Attack Destroyer 
The future surface combatant programs have 
adapted to the projected flat Navy budgets. Besides just 
building new combat systems capabilities, the Navy has 
placed a new emphasis on weapon affordability issues. 
The emphasis on affordability is shown with the 
first of the 21 st century surface combatant (SC-21) family, 
00-21, the Land Attack Destroyer. Projected low 
shipbuilding budgets, declining operations and maintenance 
budgets, coupled with a need to recaptilize the submarine, 
carrier, and logistics fleets in the 21st century, dictated 
that the next surface combatant must be an affordable ship 
to build and operate [Ref. 36]. The development of 00-21 
has focused on ship life cycle costs, vice acquisition 
cost. 
00-21 is targeted to cost $750 million (FY96 
dollars) and its operations, maintenance and upgrades will 
cost one-third as much as a conventional destroyer [Ref. 
37 
38, p. 12]. While traditional manning for an equally 
capable destroyer would be 440, DD-21' s obj ecti ve is 95. 
This will be accomplished by increased automation, better 
maintenance technology and optimizing manning functions 
[Ref. 39]. Even though DD-21 will be the most capable 
surface combatant ever, the planned 32 destroyers will be 
less of a burden on the Navy's resources than any other 
class of ships. 
H. SUMMARY 
The demise of the Cold War negated the justification 
for the Reagan Defense build-up. The post-Cold War period 
saw deficit reduction take precedence, as well as a shift 
in discretionary spending priorities away from Defense. 
The government changed its budgetary strategy of deficit 
targets to limiting spending and guaranteeing the baseline 
level of revenues. The discretionary spending limits of 
the BEA took the maj ori ty of its deficit reductions from 
the negative real growth of Defense spending. 
Likewise, Navy budgets were sharply reduced from 1990 
to 1998. O&M, procurement, and RDT&E funding steadily 
declined throughout the period. Surface combatant force 
levels dropped through accelerated deactivation and 
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decreased rates of new ship procurements. The Arsenal 
Ship, a program proj ected to significantly alter surface 
combatant requirements, was cancelled due to insufficient 
funding. Planning for surface combatants of the 21 st 
century is now focused on life cycle affordabili ty. The 
first of the SC-21 family, DD-21, incorporates innovative 
technology and manning to reduce life cycle costs. 
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III. NAVAL DOCTRINE AFTER THE COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the post-Cold War change in 
naval strategy and its effect on surface combatant forces. 
The first part of the chapter focuses on the major strategy 
papers that demonstrated the shift in emphasis from 
planning war at sea toward supporting joint operations on 
land from the sea. To illustrate naval strategy before the 
transition, "The Maritime Strategy" (1986) is explained, 
including the Soviet threat it was to counter in the 1980s. 
Then "The Way Ahead" (1991) is examined to discuss the 
doctrinal transition due to the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact. Finally, " ... From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward ... From 
the Sea" (1994) are reviewed to show the direction of 
present naval strategy. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the 
direction of surface combatants due to the new naval 
strategy. This is illustrated by the development of new 
weapon systems and combatant concepts in support of the 
littoral battlespace. 
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B. THE SOVIET THREAT 
The competition between the Soviet Union and the 
United States escalated during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
u. S. increasingly felt threatened by the growth of Soviet 
military power and their expansion into the Third World. 
Through military aid, insurgency, or direct coercion, 
the Soviets were expanding and strengthening their 
influence throughout the world in the 1980s. In 1979, the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in order to install a new 
communist regime. In 1981, Polish authorities imposed 
martial law to crack down on the Solidarity movement and 
avert a Soviet invasion. By 1984, the Soviets were 
delivering 33,000 metric tons of military equipment per 
year to Nicaragua, in addition to coordinating advisors 
from Cuba, East Germany, Libya, and North Korea. Through 
its clients, Cuba and Nicaragua, the Soviets were fostering 
guerrilla warfare in El Salvador and Guatemala and urging 
Honduran leftists towards revolutionary activity during the 
early 1980s. [Ref. 40] 
At the same time, the Soviet military was in the midst 
of a significant military build-up through the improvement 
of weapon systems and enlargement of conventional forces. 
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From 1981 to 1985 Soviet ground divisions grew from 181 to 
199 in strength. In 1984, 3,200 new main battle force 
tanks were manufactured and added to the existing 52,000 
tank inventory. Their new strategic Backfire bombers were 
being produced at a rate of 30 per year. The fourth Kiev-
class carrier was being prepared to join the fleet and 
construction continued on an entirely new class of aircraft 
carrier rivaling u.S. carrier capabilities. The second 
nuclear-powered Kirov-class cruiser was completed and a 
third ship was in construction. Nine separate classes of 
Soviet submarines were in production, including the third 
Typhoon-class strategic ballistic missile submarine. [Ref. 
40] 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet worldwide influence 
increased dramatically through overseas deployments of a 
new, more capable blue-water navy., Not since WWII had 
there been a potential threat at sea to challenge u. S. 
global interests [Ref. 41, p. 47]. In 1985, the Soviet 
fleet was comprised of three aircraft carriers, 287 surface 
combatants, 380 submarines, and 1,913 other minor 
combatants and auxiliaries. The Soviets developed a 
formidable blue-water force, able to challenge u.S. global 
interests. The Soviet fleet regularly deployed to the 
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Indian Ocean, West Africa, South China Sea, and Pacific 
Ocean. In Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, the Soviets built a large 
forward deployed naval base with airfields for bombers and 
fighters [Ref. 40, p. 35] 
Closer to horne, Victor-class nuclear attack submarines 
were routinely operated outside of principal u.s. naval 
bases. The Soviet fleet frequently operated out of Cuban 
naval bases and conducted j oint training with the Cuban 
navy . Their exercises consisted of deploying to the 
. chokepoints in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. [Ref. 
23, p.32] 
C. "THE MARITIME STRATEGY" 
In 1986, the. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
published "The Maritime Strategy" by Secretary of the Navy 
John F. Lehman, CNO Admiral James D. Watkins, and 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) General P. X. Kelly. 
"The Maritime Strategy" was the most definitive and 
authoritative public statement ever of naval strategy for 
the Cold War period. The unclassified strategic paper, 
consisting of three parts, "The Maritime Strategy," "The 
Amphibious Warfare Strategy," and "The 600-Ship Navy," was 
collectively known as "The Maritime Strategy." "The 
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Mari time Strategy" and "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy" 
portions described naval strategy for global confrontation 
wi th the Soviet Union. "The 600-Ship Navy" explained the 
rationale for the naval build-up. [Ref. 22] 
Using "The Maritime Strategy," the DoN planned for the 
use of naval forces from peacetime operations through 
global war to war termination. The primary strategy was 
deterring global war with the Soviets through U. S. 
engagement of Soviet expansion intititives. If deterrence 
failed, then naval forces were to bring an end to the 
conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. [Ref. 22] 
The Navy was to accomplish deterrence through 
deployment of a 600-ship fleet. The fleet was organized 
into carrier, battleship, amphibious, and underway 
replenishment battle groups. In peacetime, the battle 
groups were to be forward deployed and engaged around the 
world to deter crisis. [Ref. 23] 
In the event of global war, multiple battle groups 
were to mobilize and escort reinforcements to Europe. In 
addi tion to Europe, the Navy was to exert global pressure 
on all fronts. The Soviets' central objective was Europe. 
The U.S., through its multiple battle groups, was to divert 
the Soviet's attention to other geographical fronts. The 
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Navy and Marine Corps were to attack throughout the Soviet 
homeland and draw Soviet resources from the European 
theater. [Ref. 22] 
Naval forces were to prepare for a fight throughout 
the world. 
Mediterranean, 
The battles were to take place in the 
Caribbean, Middle East, Southeast Asia, 
Indian Ocean, and Bering Strait. The North Atlantic, 
specifically the Greenland-Iceland-Uni ted Kingdom Gap, was 
a key strategic area for the war. The goal was to preserve 
safe lanes of transit. [Ref. 22] 
Naval warfare was expected to consist of open-ocean 
conflicts. u.S. battle groups were to prepare for 
confrontations with Soviet long-range bombers, submarines 
and surface action groups. The focus was anti-submarine, 
anti-surface, and anti-air warfare for the destruction of 
the Soviet fleet. Strike warfare was to be used in support 
of NATO fronts in Europe or in Northeast Asia. Amphibious 
warfare consisted of Marine amphibious brigade size raids 
or forcible entries to seize beachheads. [Ref. 22] 
Joint operations received relatively little emphasis 
in "The Maritime Strategy." In the paper, efforts towards 
jointness were demonstrated by doctrine for employment of 
Air Force AWACS and B-52s in maritime missions and the 
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identification of aerial refueling requirements. The 
strategy also mentions the use of the Coast Guard in time 
of war. [Ref. 22, p. 5] Compared to present naval doctrine, 
joint operations during the period of "The Maritime 
Strategy" were not the priority for conducting sea control 
and open-ocean warfare. 
D. "THE WAY AHEAD" 
In 1991, the U.S. Naval Institute published "The Way 
Ahead" in its April issue of the Proceedings. Written by 
Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III, CNO Admiral 
Frank B. Kelso, and CMC General Carl E. Mundy Jr., "The Way 
Ahead" signaled the beginning of change for the Navy as it 
moved forward to new challenges in naval strategy in the 
post-Cold War era. 
This strategic paper was published during a 
transitional period, both internationally and domestically. 
In 1991, the Soviet Union was in its last year of existence 
and the Warsaw Pact had dissolved the year before. The BEA 
in 1990 was enacted and Defense resources were subj ect to 
tight discretionary spending controls. With the tight 
fiscal environment, DoD pursued increased joint cooperation 
to produce budgetary savings. In 1991, the U.S. was 
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celebrating the Desert Storm victory, an unprecedented 
success since WWII. 
The Navy's participation in the Gulf conflict was seen 
as minimal and the Tailhook scandal was under investigation 
in Congress [Ref. 20, p. 179]. The Marine Corps played a 
vital role in the Desert Storm land assault and was 
exerting more influence within the DoN [Ref. 42]. 
For this transitional period, "The Way Ahead" directed 
naval strategy to the unstable Soviet military power and 
possible regional contingencies. The new strategy 
acknowledged the changing world environment but warned 
against a resurgent Soviet Union: 
While our new defense strategy is geared 
primarily to regional threats to U. S. interests, 
it also must take into account the uncertainty 
surrounding the ongoing upheaval in the Soviet 
Union and Central Europe, and the capabilities of 
the Soviet Military that we expect to remain in 
place during the foreseeable future. . We must 
preserve our ability to reconstitute adequate 
forces, if faced with a resurgent global threat 
to peace. [Ref. 43, p. 38] 
In addition to preparing for a Soviet reemergence, 
naval leadership focused on threats to regional stability. 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq showed the U.S. the turmoil 
that can be created by a rogue state seeking regional 
power. Humani tarian assistance, nation-building, security 
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assistance, peacekeeping, counternarcotic, 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response 
operations were to receive new emphasis as naval missions 
[Ref. 43, p. 41]. 
Wi th new Defense spending restraints in fiscal year 
1991, the Navy argued for a greater budget share. The Navy 
fel t that their worldwide engagement of the Soviets was a 
maj or factor in the Cold War termination. In addition, 
"The Way Ahead" pointed out that the Navy was best sui ted 
for the changing world environment. Wi th overseas bases 
diminishing, the Navy argued that it was the ideal force 
since it was forward deployed and self-reliant. [Ref. 44, 
p. 171] During testimony for the House Armed Services 
Committee in February 1991, CNO Admiral Trost 
paraphrased in Proceedings as saying: 
Even if one were to put one's hand over the map 
of eastern Europe and disregard it entirely as a 
defense planning concern, the United States would 
still require a navy not only of about the same 
size, but of the same general structure as well. 
[Re f. 44, p. 168] 
was 
Congress did not like the Navy's new strategy in 1991. 
Critics lambasted the Navy for being unwilling to recognize 
and respond to the post-Cold War era [Ref. 44, p. 171]. 
The poor reception of the "The Way Ahead" and the Navy's 
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force strategy set the stage for a new vision to be 
introduced in 1992. 
E. " . FROM THE SEA" 
In 1992, Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe, CNO 
Admiral Kelso, and CMC General Mundy signed a new Navy and 
Marine Corps white paper called " ... From the Sea." After 
strong criticism for the Navy's lack of post-Cold War 
strategy changes in the Navy's 1991 paper, " ... From the Sea" 
signaled a new vision for American sea power. 
Preparation for global war with the Soviet Union was 
shelved and major regional contingencies in areas of 
critical U.S. interest became the primary planning 
objective. Naval forces no longer were to focus on open-
ocean warfighting against enemy fleets. Instead, they were 
to emphasize joint littoral warfare. [Ref. 4] 
Li t toral warfare was to present a new challenge to 
naval forces. It is a complex, compressed battlespace that 
can place high demands on naval capabilities. In certain 
respects, littoral operations can be more demanding on 
naval forces than the Cold War scenario of mid-ocean 
operations against Soviet maritime forces. [Ref. 12, pp. 
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19-20] The Navy summarized its view on the littoral 
environment in " ... From the Sea": 
The littoral region is frequently 
characterized by confined and congested water and 
air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and 
neutrals making identification profoundly 
difficult. This environment poses varying 
technical and tactical challenges to naval 
forces. It is an area where our adversaries can 
concentrate and layer their defenses. In an era 
when arms proliferation means some Third World 
countries possess sophisticated weaponry, there 
is a wide range of potential challenges. 
For example, an adversary's submarines 
operating in shallow waters pose a particular 
challenge to naval forces. Similarly, coastal 
missile batteries can be positioned to "hide" 
from radar coverage. Some littoral threats 
specifically mines, sea-skimming cruise missiles, 
and tactical ballistic missiles tax the 
capabilities of our current systems and force 
structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be 
presumed. It does not derive directly from 
command of the high seas. It is an obj ecti ve 
which requires our focused skills and resources. 
[Ref. 4, p. 94] 
To support the new doctrine, the Navy and Marine Corps 
packaged their capabilities differently in " ... From the Sea" 
than prior strategic policy papers. In this paper, the 
Navy and Marine Corps team is a joint warfighting tool to 
be utilized for a wide range of missions by unified 
commanders. The new direction for the naval service is 
summarized in the motto "Naval Expeditionary Forces 
Shaped for Joint Operations - Operating Forward, From the 
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Sea Tailored for National Needs." The naval 
expedi tionary forces are to respond to any crisis and can 
provide the initial "enabling" capability for joint 
operations, as well as continued participation in any 
sustained operation. The paper asserts that the Navy and 
Marine Corps are trained to be a "sea-air-land" team, able 
to respond immediately to the unified commanders as they 
execute national policy. [Ref. 4] 
Joint and combined operations are a recurring theme in 
" ... From the Sea." The white paper asserts that the Navy and 
Marine Corps can seize and defend an enemy's port, naval 
base, or coastal air base to allow entry by heavy Army or 
Air Force forces. " ... From the Sea" also asserts that naval 
commanders can command a joint task force while the 
operation is primarily maritime and shift command ashore at 
the unified commander's discretion. The paper finishes 
with immediate tasks for the Navy and Marine Corps. The 
majority of these tasks are changes to structure, weapons 
systems, training, and warfare for joint operations. [Ref. 
4] This shift to jointness was a dramatic attitude change 
from the earlier budgetary arguing by the Navy in 1991. 
To support joint operations, the new direction of 
\\ ... From the Sea" created the concept of battlespace 
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dominance. Battlespace dominance is the control of sub-
surface, air, surface, and land dimensions to ensure 
successful littoral operations [Ref. 45, p. 63] • 
Traditionally, the Navy practiced sub-surface, air, and 
surface warfare for the destruction of the Soviet fleet and 
strike warfare to support the NATO front. Wi th " ... From the 
Sea," the Navy was to direct its warfare skills to 
battlespace dominance to influence events on land. 
The new concept of battlespace dominance changed 
.traditional naval warfare. Air warfare expanded its 
mission responsibilities to theater missile defense (TMD) , 
placing a protective umbrella over ground operations. In 
the new littoral environment, sub-surface warfare was to 
consist of searching for small diesel submarines and mines 
in shallow water vice hunting Soviet ballistic missile 
submarines. Instead of facing maj or combatants, surface 
warfare was to direct its attention to defending against 
small missile patrol boats and providing more substantial 
naval surface fire support. The Navy placed a new emphasis 
on Tomahawk cruise missile capabilities for both joint 
strike and ground warfare. [Ref. 4] 
53 
F. "FORWARD. . . FROM THE SEA" 
In 1994, the Navy updated and expanded " ... From the Sea" 
with "Forward ... From the Sea." The new paper reaffirmed the 
direction of " ... From the Sea" and further explained the Navy 
and Marine Corps forward presence role. [Ref. 46] 
"Forward ... From the Sea" placed a greater emphasis on 
peacetime operations and the role played in such operations 
by the Navy and Marine Corps. The white paper stresses 
that naval forces, operating from "sea bases" in 
international waters, can prevent conflicts and control 
crisis. This is accomplished by a wide range of missions 
and tasks, such as making protocol visits in fo~eign ports, 
and conducting regional, bilateral, and multilateral 
training exercises to enhance diplomacy and improve 
interoperabili ty amongst allies. In emergencies, forward 
deployed forces can rapidly respond to humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief efforts. Addi tionally in 
the 1990s, the Navy has provided substantial contributions 
to U.S. counternarcotics operations around Central and 
South America [Ref. 1, p. 37]. 
"Forward ... From the Sea" expands the mission of TMD to 
the maintenance of peacetime stability. The paper asserts 
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that ballistic missile defense is not only useful for 
conflict but also conventional deterrence: 
Forward deployed surface warships - cruisers and 
destroyers wi th theater ballistic defense 
capabili ties will play an increasingly important 
role in discouraging the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles by extending credible defenses 
to friendly and allied countries. [Ref. 46, p. 4] 
Due to Russia and China's attempts to acquire wealth 
through military exports, ballistic missile proliferation 
has grown. Nations such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya 
and Syria have active programs in pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), placing regional stability in 
jeopardy. [Ref. 47, p. 56] In this uncertain security 
environment, an Aegis combatant off a coast can protect 
allies against rogue nations and terrorists using WMD. The 
Navy asserts that ballistic missile defense will slow 
proliferation and promote regional stability. 
Go. DOCTRINAL TRENDS 
The shift in naval doctrine is illustrated by 
comparing the defined threats, strategies, naval missions, 
and warfare asserted by the four papers. Tab I e 3 . 1 is a 
comparison of the maj or naval strategic policy papers for 
the Cold War transition. 
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Table 3.1: Major Naval Strategic Policy Papers, 1986-1994. 
"The Maritime "The Way " ... From the "Forward .. From 
Strategy" Ahead" Sea" the Sea" 
(1986) (1991) (1992) (1994) 
Threat Soviet Union, Soviet Rogue Rogue Nations, 




Strategy Global War Global War, Regional Regional 
Regional Conflicts Conflicts 
Conflicts 
Type of Open-Ocean Open-Ocean Joint Joint Littoral 
Naval Littoral 
Warfare 
Naval Sea Control Sea Control Battlespace Battlespace 
Mission Dominance, Dominance, 
Power Power 
Projection Projection 
"The Maritime Strategy" was classic naval doctrine, 
demonstrating a strong influence from Admiral Thayer Mahan. 
Mahan believed that empires rose and fell with their 
control or lack of control of the sea. He believed a navy 
should be comprised of grand "capital" ships and 
participate in large confrontations. He emphasized 
strategic points and maintaining the sea lanes of 
communication [Ref. 48]. Utilizing this approach in "The 
Maritime Strategy," carrier and battleship battle groups 
and submarines were to achieve sea control and secure the 
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strategic chokepoints through destruction of the Soviet 
fleet. 
The new trend in naval doctrine outlined in " ... From the 
Sea" is contrary to Mahan's theories. Mahan did not 
believe in the employment of naval forces against land 
forces. In the littoral, he felt naval forces locked up 
their offensive strength in a defensive effort and that 
they could not match land forces' defensive capabilities. 
[Ref. 48] 
H. SURFACE COMBATANTS 
The post-Cold War naval doctrine changed the focus and 
technological requirements of surface combatants to joint 
Ii ttoral warfare. Surface combatants are now expected to 
influence events ashore through battlespace dominance and 
power projection. To increase their influence, the Navy 
has placed a greater priority on TMD, strike warfare, and 
naval surface fire support operations. For battlespace 
dominance and power projection, the Navy is in the process 
of improving existing surface combatant capabilities and 
shaping new ship concepts. 
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1. Battlespace Dominance 
4. Theater Ba~~istic ~ssile Defense 
DoD recognized early on that surface combatants 
had an inherent TMD capability in its Aegis weapons system, 
demonstrated by its success in detecting Iraqi Scud 
missiles during the Gulf War. The Navy has become an 
acti ve participant in the effort by the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO) to develop a maritime 
capability against this threat. [Ref. 49, p. 12] 
The Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) 
program is based on evolving the air defense capabilities 
of Aegis combatants to contend with the intercept 
requirements of ballistic missiles. The first stage of 
evolving this capability is called the Navy Area TBMD 
program. During this stage, 
be upgraded to 
Missiles will 
support area 
be modified to 
the Aegis combat system will 
TMD and Navy SM-2 Standard 
engage ballistic missiles. 
This area defense program will provide a lower-tier 
intercept capability. [Ref. 50, p. 2-12] 
The second stage of the Navy TBMD program will 
expand the battlespace of the Navy Area TBMD system through 
addi tional upgrades to the Aegis combat system. The Navy 
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will also develop an upper-tier interceptor, the SM-3 
Standard Missile, to provide a theater-wide TBMD capability 
to intercept WMD. SM-3 Standard Missiles will provide the 
kinetic kill (skin to skin) capability to be effective 
against WMD. [Ref. 50, p. 2-12] 
Naval forces are ideal for employment of TBMD to 
an undeveloped region. Naval TBMD provides immediate, 
visible support for allies while acting as a non-intrusive 
sea-based entity. For littoral protection, surface 
combatants can protect U. S. interests from the sea. [Ref. 
50, p. 2-9] During the early stages of a conflict, Aegis 
combatants may be the only U.S. theater air defense 
capability. The TMD systems on Aegis combatants are 
intended to create an immediate defensive umbrella for 
expedi tionary forces as they assemble and move into the 
theater of operations. [Ref. 50, p. 2-13] 
During amphibious operations, Aegis combatants 
will perform TMD coverage and coordinate the Marine Corps 
Hawk batteries, a lower tier missile defense. As Army 
forces are inserted, Aegis combatants will expand their 
coordination of the battlespace and supervise Patriot lower 
tier and Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) upper 
tier missile systems. [Ref. 50, p. 2-13] 
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By September 1999, the Navy plans to achieve an 
area theater missile defense capability on at least two 
cruisers for operational testing and use in a national 
emergency. The remaining Aegis cruisers and destroyers 
will be equipped with theater missile defense capabilities 
between fiscal years 2000 and 2011. [Ref. 51, p. 2] 
b.Cooperative Bngagement Concept 
A vital technology for Navy TBMD is the 
Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC). This computer-based 
information exchange system permits the simultaneous 
sharing of detailed targeting information between ships or 
forces at extensive ranges within the littoral area. CEC 
increases reaction time and firing opportunities against 
enemy missile attacks. By creating a single composite 
threat picture from all the sea, air, and land-based 
sensors in the area, ships with less sophisti.cated combat 
systems will have the same quality sensor, decision, and 
engagement information as Aegis-equipped ships. [Ref. 1, p. 
66] 
This system is designed to enhance capabilities 
to rapidly respond to enemy attacks by providing an over-
the-horizon capability. Units will be able to defend 
against threats that are not yet detected by organic 
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sensors. The Navy believes this capability will be a major 
defense against anti-ship sea-skimming cruise missiles. 
[Ref. 1, p. 67] 
CEC is the Navy's first development towards 
network centric warfare. The new warfare concept is a 
shift from platform-centric to network centric 
architectures. The Navy wants to distribute the tactical 
picture among a number of platforms through networking. 
This is vital since the littoral environment requires 
integration of sensors and combat systems in a common 
tactical picture. [Ref. 52] 
As of November 1998, two Aegis cruisers, an 
aircraft carrier, and an amphibious assault helicopter 
carrier have CEC installed. The Navy plans to install CEC 
on additional aircraft carriers, surface combatants, 
amphibious ships, and carrier based E-2C aircraft between 
fiscal years 2000 and 2010. [Ref. 1, p. 67] 
2. Power Projection 
a. !'omabawk 
The Tomahawk cruise missile enables surface 
combatants to launch attacks against land targets from long 
ranges in all types of weather. The Navy is making 
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various improvements to the Tomahawk to increase its 
effectiveness, flexibility, and responsiveness and 
strengthen mission planning capabilities aboard ships. In 
addition to upgrades to the missile's guidance, navigation, 
and control systems, the Navy plans to incorporate a 
penetrating warhead, which will expand potential targets to 
include weapon bunkers and reinforced structures. [Ref. 1, 
p. 64] 
Significant changes are planned for tactical 
employment of Tomahawk in support of the ground war. 
Presently, Tomahawks can be deployed against strategically 
important targets such as command and control facilities 
and radar sites, under the direction of the unified 
commanders. [Ref. 1, p. 64] The new tactical variant of 
Tomahawk will be capable of loitering for 3.5 hours and up 
to 200 nautical miles from launch point and could be 
redirected from programmed targets to higher priority, 
emergent or relocated targets [Ref. 53, p. 11]. Using the 
missile for tactical applications could have a significant 
impact on ship operations and the number of Tomahawk 
missiles in theater due to the potential increase in 
missions and targets. Additionally, the U.S. military is 
changing the command and control structure for strike 
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warfare, which will allow theater commanders to use 
Tomahawk missiles for tactical applications. [Ref. 1, p. 4J 
b. Naval Surface Fire Support 
The 1992 Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) 
Mission Needs Statement (MNS) and the Marine Corps 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) concept 
established requirements for a combination of guns, 
rockets, and missiles with sufficient range, accuracy, and 
lethality to meet a wide range of littoral missions [Ref. 
53, p. 11 J • The Navy is developing a variety of weapon 
systems that can provide these capabilities. 
(1) Naval Gunfire Support. The Navy has 
acquisition programs that will produce a 5-inch/62-caliber 
gun system by 2001, capable of delivering rocket-assisted 
proj ectiles to an obj ecti ve range of 63 nautical miles. 
The rocket-assisted proj ectiles are called Extended Range 
Guided Munitions (EGRM) and utilize a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) receiver to navigate. [Ref. 54, p. 34J 
(2) Vertical Gun for Advanced Ships. The 
Navy is also developing the Vertical Gun for Advanced Ships 
(VGAS), capable of employing GPS and an inertial guidance 
system for a range of 100 nautical miles. The VGAS concept 
includes dual 52-caliber, 155mm guns capable of firing 3-12 
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rounds a minute from a magazine storing 750 to 1,500 
rounds. The system is designed for DD-21 and will begin 
development in fiscal year 1999. [Ref. 54, p.34] 
(3) Land Attack Standard Missile. To meet 
the Marine Corps' requirement of responsiveness, or the 
time between target designation and its destruction, the 
Navy is pursuing the Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM). 
Its mission is interdiction and counter-battery fires in 
support of forces ashore. The LASMs are SM - 2 Standard 
Missiles converted from anti-air to land attack missiles. 
They will have payloads of up to 1,000 pounds and a range 
of 250 nautical miles [Ref. 55, p. 36]. A stockpile of 
1200 SM-2 missiles is available for retrofit. Flight 
demonstrations were done in fiscal year 1998 and more are 
scheduled in fiscal year 1999 with an initial operating 
capability scheduled for 2003. [Ref. 56] 
3. New Ship Concepts 
Two new ship concepts were designed specifically to 
operate in the joint littoral environment. The Navy began 
development of the Arsenal Ship, later cancelled, as 
explained in Chapter II, and the Land Attack Destroyer, DD-
21. 
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a. Tbe Arsenal Sbip 
The Arsenal Ship was to 'provide u.S. unified 
theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) with substantial in-
theater or early arriving firepower in the form of 500 
precision-guided missiles of different kinds, mostly for 
attacking targets on land. The Arsenal Ship's missiles 
were to be controlled and targeted by joint u.S. military 
commanders on other ships, aircraft, or shore stations. 
[Ref. 37, p. 13] 
Since the Arsenal Ship was to act as a "remote 
magazine," its combat system would have been relatively 
simple and inexpensive. The ship was to receive data from 
other ships, aircraft, satellites, and shore stations using 
CEC and other data links. The targeting, mission planning, 
and command-and-decision functions of the ship's weapons 
were to be located aboard another unit. In addition to 
precision-guided missiles, the Navy planned to install the 
new 5-inch/62-caliber gun or VGAS. [Ref. 37, p. 20] 
b. Tbe 21-t Centu~ Land Attack Destroyer 
As a revolutionary new platform, the 21st Century 
Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) will be built from the keel 
up with the tenets of Network Centric Warfare and offensive 
distributed firepower. The 21st Century Land Attack 
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Oestroyer will be a multi-mission ship, meeting forward 
presence and deterrence requirements of the geographic 
CINCs. It will operate with naval, joint, and combined 
mari time forces, contributing to joint and combined 
battlespace dominance and power projection in littoral 
operations. 00-21's primary mission will be supporting 
ground forces. It is designed to stop a ground assault 
through power projection. [Ref. 53, p.11] 
The Land Attack Oestroyer will require greatly 
improved capabilities in a number of areas. 00-21 will be 
equipped with a 155rnm howitzer surface fire support 
vertical gun and EGRMs. LASMs and the tactical variant 
Tomahawk will be in 00-21' s weapon arsenal for long-range 
power projection. It will have the most advanced undersea 
warfare combat systems suite, specifically designed for the 
environmental challenges and operational threats posed by 
the littorals. Its hangar will contain room for both 
attack helicopters and a system of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs). The 00-21 ship design will significantly reduce 
radar signatures by utilizing the latest in stealth 
technology. [Ref. 57] 
As of 1998, two shipbuilding design teams, 
Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron Works, were working on 
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the development of DD-21. Construction is to begin in 
fiscal year 2004 and the lead ship is scheduled to enter 
the fleet in fiscal year 2008 [Ref. 52]. 
:I. SUMMARY 
Naval strategy and warfare have changed dramatically 
in the last two decades. The Soviet's influence and 
expanding military power alarmed the U.S., provoking a 
massive U.S. military build-up and an increased 
confrontational focus. The Navy's Cold War strategy of 
Soviet containment was outlined in 1986 with "The Maritime 
Strategy." This naval strategy emphasized global warfare 
on the open-ocean with the Soviet fleet. 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and break-up of the 
Soviet Union changed the national strategy, and in turn, 
naval strategy. In 1991, the Navy unsuccessfully tried to 
direct a new naval strategy in the white paper "The Way 
Ahead. " 
In 1992, " ... From the Sea" was published, providing a 
new vision for naval warfare. Naval forces were to focus 
on joint littoral warfare. The 1994 white paper 
"Forward ... From the Sea" reasserted the new emphasis on 
67 
littoral operations and explained the role of naval forces 
in peacetime stability. 
In support of the new naval strategy, surface 
combatants shifted their warfare emphasis from war at sea 
to war in the littoral. Instead of escorting battle groups 
on the open-ocean, surface combatants are to have a direct 
influence on ground campaigns. 
Surface combatants will achieve greater influence 
through battlespace dominance and power projection. The 
Navy is in the process of developing weapons systems for 
surface combatants to provide theater ballistic missile 
defense and increased naval surface firepower., The next 
generation of surface combatants, Arsenal Ship and DD-21, 
were specifically designed with capabilities in support of 
littoral operations. 
To summarize, examining the two most recent destroyer 
programs illustrates the change in naval doctrine and 
warfare for the post-Cold War period. In 1986, the new 
battle force combatant, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, 
was under construction. It was to be an advanced multi-
mission Aegis combatant, designed to fight the Soviet fleet 
and long-range bomber squadrons. Over a decade later, the 
21st Century Land Attack Destroyer, DD-21, is being designed 
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with massive littoral firepower, operating on a network 
provided tactical picture. The Cold War designed Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyers are being modified to conduct 
theater ballistic missile defense and extended gunfire 
support for the littoral battlespace. The 1980s and 1990s' 
concepts for destroyers clearly demonstrate the naval 
doctrine shift from war at sea to land attack. 
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IV. OPNAV REORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the OPNAV Staff was reorganized and Navy 
program planning was changed. This chapter explains the 
OPNAV Staff reorganization and the subsequent change to the 
program planning process up until the Secretary of the 
Navy's review. This is accomplished by describing the 
makeup of the staff and the programming process before and 
after the reorganization. The effect of these changes is 
then examined in relation to the first budget after the 
reorganization, fiscal year 1994, and surface combatant 
planning. In addition, the development of a new assessment 




B. OPNAV STAFF 
the implications for surface 
In 1986, the OPNAV Staff was reorganized by CNO 
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost to strengthen the CNO's 
position. Admiral Trost's reorganization shifted away from 
the platform focus of OPNAV and back to the functional 
focus the organization had after WWII. He made the warfare 
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area deputies assistant chiefs and the major directors 
deputy chiefs. The five new Deputy Chiefs of Naval 
Operations (DCNOs) became Manpower, Personnel, and Training 
(OP-Ol), Logistics (OP-04), Plans, Policy, and Operations 
(OP-06), Naval Warfare (OP-07), and Navy Program Planning 
(OP-08) . The new Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations 
(ACNOs) were Undersea Warfare (OP-02), Surface Warfare (OP-
03), and Air Warfare (OP-05). [Ref. 58, p. 125] Figure 4.1 
depicts the OPNAV Staff organization from 1986 to 1992. 
The deputy positions, with responsibilities that 
crossed warfare boundaries, such as program planning, were 
designed to share influence with the assistant positions 
whose responsibilities focused wi thin a warfare area, such 
as surface warfare [Ref. 58, p. 2]. In reality, decisions 
about the allocation of resources within the Navy had been 
worked out through a staff dominated by five major 
spokesmen. Three of these were vice admirals who advocated 
the perspectives and resource claims of the Navy's three 
warfare communities. These were the so-called "platform 
barons," a term implying their relative independence and 
equal power status. Their "fiefdoms" were naval aviation, 
surface warfare and submarines and included the research, 
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development, and acquisition bureaucracies that worked for 
and within these platform categories. [Ref. 59, p. 70] 
**** Admiral CNO 








DeNO ACNO ACNO DCNO 
(Manpower, (Undersea (Surface (Logistics) 
Personnel & Warfare) Warfare) OP-04 
Training) OP-02 OP-03 *** 
OP-01 *** *** *** 
• • • 
--ACNO DCNO DCNO DCNO 
(Air Warfare) (Plans, (Naval (Navy 
OP-05 Policy, & Warfare) Program 
*** Operations) OP-07 Planning) 
OP-06 *** *** OP-08 *** 
• • • • 
Director of Director of Director of Director of 
Naval Nuclear Naval Space and 
Intelligence Propulsion Medicine Electronic 
OP-092 Program OP-093 Warfare 
** OP-091 **** *** OP-094 *** 
-- ---
• • 
Director of Oceanographer Director of Director of 
Naval of the Navy Religious Test and 
Reserve OP-096 Ministries Evaluation 
OP-095 ** OP-097 OP-098 
** ** *** 
Figure 4.1: OPNAV Staff, 1986-1991. 
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The other two major spokesmen were OP-07, Naval 
Warfare, and OP-OB, Program Planning. The former was 
charged with reconciling the resource claims of each 
warfare sponsor with a general vision for the Navy through 
the "warfare appraisal process". OP-OB was responsible for 
translating the results of the appraisal process into the 
PPBS. This structure was consciously designed in the early 
1970s to stimulate competitive views on the Navy's future 
between OP-07 and OP-OB. [Ref. 59, p. 70] 
C. REORGANIZATION 
Due to the release of " ... From the Sea" in 1992, naval 
forces were expected to be an integral part of the 
mili tary' s effort to. directly control events ashore. The 
Navy was no longer to think in terms of coordinating naval 
operations in one part of the world, with ground force 
operations in another part. " ... From the Sea" required the 
Navy to think in terms of integrated operations with the 
other military services in the same region. [Ref. 59, p. 
69] 
In 1992, the eNO, Admiral F.B. Kelso was unable to 
build a consensus among the OPNAV staff on the future size 
and structure of the post-Cold War Navy. Admiral Kelso 
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decided the staff needed to be reorganized to realize new 
modes of staff interaction and naval concepts. The staff 
reorganization was announced in August and implemented by 
October. [Ref. 59, p. 70 ] The new OPNAV Staff 
organization is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
**** Admiral eND 
*** Vice Adm NOO 
** RearAdm. 
**** Director Navy Staff N9B • 
VeND Te.t & Eval N091 •• Systems Surgeon Gen. N093 ••• 
Commands N09 Naval Reaerve N09S •• 
**** I-- Oceanographer NOl6 •• Chaplain. N097·· 
I 
DeNO Director of Naval DeNO 
(Manpower & Intelligence (Plans, Policy 
Personnel) N2 ** and Operations) 
N1 *** N3/5 *** 
DCNO Director of Director of Naval 
(Logistics) Space, Training 












Figure 4.2: 1992 OPNAV Staff. 
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The reorganization served two restructuring purposes. 
The DoD's Base Force concept was officially adopted with 
the 1992 National Military Strategy, necessitating a 13 
percent reduction in Navy active duty strength by the end 
of 1997 [Ref. 60, p. 44]. As part of that reduction, the 
OPNAV reorganization removed some of the 34 flag billets 
required to be eliminated by the Navy [Ref. 61, p. 122]. 
The new organization also made the structure and functions 
of OPNAV congruent with their Joint Staff counterparts, 
reflecting the new emphasis on joint operations in the 
littoral. [Ref. 62] 
The reorganization created a new office, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and 
Assessments (N8). The new N8 organization was designed to 
ensure the review of naval capabilities in a joint context. 
The reorganization was undertaken to eliminate barriers 
between individual naval warfare communities and other 
services. [Ref. 62] 
Several programming functions that had been divided 
among separate staff offices were consolidated under the 
new N8. The new office maintained the programming and 
budgeting responsibilities of its predecessor, OP-08, but 
also assumed the warfare appraisal functions of OP-07. The 
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tension between the competing views on naval warfare by op-
07 and OP-08 were now combined into one central office. 
[Ref. 59, p. 
organization. 
70] Figure 4.3 contains the new N8 
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**** Admiral DCNO 
*** Vice Adm 
(Naval Resources. Warfare 
Requirements & 
** Rear Adm U/H Assessments) 
* Rear Adm LlH N8 *** 
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Director of Director of Director of Fiscal 
Programming Assessment Management 
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N80 ** N81 ** N82 ** 
Director of CINC Director of Director of 
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N83 * Warfare Division Division 
N85 ** N8S ** 
Director of Director of Air Director of 
Submarine Warfare Division Special 
Warfare Division N88 ** Programs 
N87 ** Division 
N89 ** 
Figure 4.3: N8 Organization. 
The reorganization downgraded the "platform barons" 
(OP-02, OP-03, and OP-05) from vice admiral to rear admiral 
positions and subordinated their offices to N8 control. No 
longer did they work directly for the Vice eNO. The 
absorption of the air, surface, and submarine "navies" 
sought to alleviate their disruptive competition. In 
announcing the reorganization, Secretary O'Keefe stated: 
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One of my primary concerns is ending rivalries 
and jealousies between the various key warfare 
fighting communities in the Navy . . . We believe 
there can be no jealousy among the fingers of a 
strong fist. This Navy reorganization will begin 
the process of bringing our warfare fighters 
together into a lighter, stronger fist. [Ref. 61, 
p. 122] 
New offices were added and placed under the direction 
of N8. The CINC Liaison Division (N83) was created for the 
specific purpose of informing the fleet CINCs about 
developments in the requirements and resources process and 
,representing CINC views. Another office, Expeditionary 
Warfare Division (N8S), was established and headed by a 
Marine Corps major general. N8S was to help forge a closer 
planning link between the Navy and Marine Corps and to 
focus on the implications of littoral warfare. 
D. PPBS PRIOR TO THE REORGANIZATION 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) 
is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in 
making choices about the allocation of resources among a 
number of competing or possible programs and al ternati ves 
to accomplish specific obj ecti ves in our national defense 
[Ref. 63, p. C-2]. Through the programming portion of 
PPBS, the OPNAV Staff assists the CNO in recommending 
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decisions to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) about 
resource allocation. 
1. Program Appraisal 
In PPBS, programming is the 
information from the Defense Planning 






resources are allocated wi thin DoN based on warfare area 
assessments, consensus of DoN high level personnel, and 
guidance by plans and policy decisions. [Ref. 64, p. 38] 
Program appraisal starts in the odd year of a two year 
POM process. Program appraisal primarily serves to 
appraise warfare and support programs, and to. assess the 
state of the Navy. Figure 4.4 summarizes the program 
appraisal process before the OPNAV reorganization. [Ref. 
64, p. 43] 
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Figure 4 . 4 : Program Appraisal 
Reorganization. Ref. 64, Figure 4. 
OCT DEC 
Prior to the OPNAV 
Before the reorganization, the Programming Division 
(OP-80) began the programming process with the issuance of 
POM Serial One to all offices participating in the 
development of the POM. POM Serials were issued throughout 
the programming phase as situations changed. 
The program appraisal process received inputs from 
various sources. During the first year, inputs were 
submi tted by the unified commanders (CINCs) as Maritime 
Concerns, by resource sponsors (OP-02, OP-03, OP-05, etc.) 
as Sponsor Change Proposals (SCPs) , and by the Navy 
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) as an Apportionment Review. 
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Starting in the late summer, appraisals were performed 
to give an overview of the current defense plan [Ref. 65, 
p. 1]. Appraisals ranged from a review of the Navy 
maritime strategy and warfighting capabilities to the 
condition of the Navy shore establishment. There were four 
broad appraisal areas, maritime strategy, functional area, 
naval warfare, and baseline area. [Ref. 64, p. 45] Table 
4.1 lists the appraisals and the responsible organizations. 








OP-Ol, OP-098, OP-81 
OP-07 with input from OP-
02, OP-03, and OP-OS, OP-
094 
Determined by the subject 
area 
The maritime strategy appraisal evaluated the broad 
naval strategy on which the subsequent functional area and 
naval warfare appraisals were based. This appraisal was 
conducted by the DeNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations 
(OP-06) and was designed to provide the Navy programming 
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offices with the underlying naval 
objectives. [Ref. 64, p. 38] 
strategy and its 
The functional area appraisals addressed the current 
status of resources in broad support areas, such as 
manpower, personnel and training, RDT&E, and medical. 
These appraisals were based on the program and budget 
levels contained in the previous year Navy budget 
submission. [Ref. 64, p. 46] 
Naval warfare appraisals evaluated the balance of Navy 
warfighting capabilities, risk, and affordability in the 
context of the National Military Strategy [Ref. 65, p. 2]. 
They covered the full spectrum of naval warfare, such as 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) , strike/anti-surface warfare 
(ASUW), amphibious and chemical warfare. Each of these 
warfare areas was addressed in terms of its operational and 
technological status. At the conclusion of the warfare 
appraisals, OP-07 generated the Summary Warfare/Readiness 
and Sustainability Appraisal, summarizing major themes from 
the individual categories and also evaluating the overall 
status of naval warfare. [Re f. 64, p. 47] 
The baseline area appraisals were special assessments 
selected by the CNO. These special assessments were to 
provide an in-depth review of selected areas, such as 
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special warfare or space programs for a certain year. [Ref. 
64, p. 47] 
During the appraisal process, additional inputs were 
submitted by different organizations. Claimants could 
submit prioritized lists of issues for consideration in the 
programming process. Also, OP-80 provided Baseline 
Assessment Memorandums (BAMs) to resource sponsors, 
indicating the costs for projected force levels. The CINCs 
submitted Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) during the 
appraisal process. These were lists with a maximum 25 CINC 
issues for the POM ranked by priority. Their concerns were 
to be answered in the POM and resource sponsors had to 
identify actions taken on each CINC issue. [Ref. 64, p. 48] 
2. POM Development Process 
At the end of the appraisal process, POM development 
started with the publication of the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG) from the Secretary of Defense. Figure 4.5 
illustrates the POM development process prior to the OPNAV 
reorganization. From the DPG, the DoN Consolidated 
Planning and Programming Guidance (DNCPPG) was developed to 
give guidance on policy and high interest items to resource 
sponsors and the Marine Corps. [Ref. 64, p. 49] 
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Ref. 64, Figure 5. 
Prior to the OPNAV 
DoD gave fiscal guidance with the allocation of 
"topline" funding to the services and agencies. DoN then 
suballocated the funds into blue/green money for the Navy 
and Marine Corp respectively. The Navy's share was then 
further allocated among resource sponsors. 
Resource sponsors submitted Sponsor Program Proposals 
(SPPs) to represent their major proposals for the POM. The 
proposals were updated with the latest BAM, program and 
policy guidance, fiscal and manpower controls, and pricing 
changes. Each sponsor presented its SPP to the Program 
Development Review Committee (PDRC). The PDRC was chaired 
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by OP-80 and staffed by representatives from each DCNO, 
ACNO, and major staff offices of OPNAV. [Ref. 64, p. 50] 
An Appropriation Review was conducted as part of POM 
development. The review examined resource allocation by 
appropriation and established supervisory control by 
individual appropriations. [Ref. 64, p. 52] 
Following the SPPs, designated resource sponsors 
prepared post SPP assessments, evaluating their programs as 
proposed by the SPPs and indicating their compliance to 
,published guidance. These reports provided input to the 
internal review or "end game H decisions for the POM. 
At the end of the POM development phase, an internal 
review was conducted. The PDRC presented the staff 
versions of the SPPs with recommendations from OP-07 and 
OP-08 to the CNO Executive Board (CEB) . The 
recommendations by OP-07 and OP-08 often conflicted due to 
the different offices striving for balance and coherence 
across all of the SPPs. From the results of the CEB, the 
tentative Navy POM was published and delivered to the 
Secretary of the Navy for review and final decisions. 
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E. JMA/SA ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The 1992 OPNAV reorganization was necessary . to 
implement the Navy's new " ... From the Sea" strategy. The 
Navy felt it was also necessary to incorporate new 
standards and criteria for determining program priorities. 
A new programming vocabulary and decision making process 
was initiated in 1992. [Ref. 59, p. 71] The new program 
planning changed the warfare appraisal and flag level 
review process. 
1. JMA/SA 
The naval warfare appraisal process was replaced with 
joint mission and support area (JMA/SA) assessments. These 
new assessments were structured through a matrix in which 
all program advocates were required to justify their 
programs in terms of their contribution to the listed 
mission areas. Discussions in each mission area sought to 
rank the applicable programs within the mission area, and 
through further discussion, within the Investment Balance 
Review (IBR). The IBR was an overall ranking of the entire 
range of Navy programs. [Ref. 59, p. 71] 
The new matrix organization was designed to end the 
vertical flow, or "stove piping," of information during the 
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warfare appraisal process. The matrix encouraged the 
horizontal flow of information and rewarded awareness of 
competing programs. Program advocates had to work with 
other program advocates to prioritize programs in each 
mission area. If an advocate was successful in getting the 
program ranked high in a particular mission area, the 
probability that it would be fully funded during the IBR 
increased. [Ref. 59, p. 71] 
The titles of the mission areas were chosen to 
introduce a joint and broad perspective to Navy 
programming. The new categories required advocates to 
demonstrate the value of their programs in terms of their 
potential contributions to joint military warfare. Success 
in programming depended on a program's contribution to the 
operational effectiveness of another service, as well as 
naval forces. [Ref. 59, p. 71] 
Since inception of the joint mission and support area 
concept, the titles and number of categories have varied 
over the years. Figure 4.6 illustrates the joint mission 
and support area assessment teams for 1998. 
The assessment teams were chaired by Navy flag or 
Marine Corps general officers and consisted of a 
"horizontal cut U of senior officers from across OPNAV. The 
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teams used seminars and wargames to examine and discuss 
warfare requirements, emerging issues, and programmatic 
alternatives. The teams drew on input from the Defense 
Science Board, Naval Research Advisory Committee, naval 
warfare centers, Center for Naval Analyses, university 
















Figure 4.6: 1998 Joint ~ssion and Support Area Assessment. 
Ref. 24 
2. New PON Development Process 
The JMA/SA assessments were integrated into a new 
program planning process. Figures 4. 7 and 4.8 illustrate 
the new program planning process. 
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Figure 4.8: Even Year Program Planning. 
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The new Navy POM process was designed to review naval 
capabilities in a joint context using the Integrated 
Requirements, Resources, and Review Board the (IR3B). This 
group represented a new concept in resource allocation. 
Table 4.2 contains the membership for the IR3B. 
Table 4.2: 1R3B Membership. Ref. 63, p. C-7. 
Chairman 
NB DCNO, Resources, Warfare Requirements, and 
Assessments 
Members 
N80 Programming NIB Manpower/Personnel 
NBl Assessment N2B Intelligence 
NB2 Fiscal N4B Logistics 
NB3 Special Programs N6B Space Systems 
NB4 RDT&E N096 Oceanographer 
NBS C3 Systems Systems Commands 
N86 Surface Center for Naval 
N87 Subsurface Analyses 
N8B Air 
The IR3B received assessments by each joint mission and 
support area category. The assessment results were 
combined into one complete Navy investment strategy, the 
Investment Balance Review. 
92 
During the even year of programming, the IBR was used 
to establish policy and guidance for POM development. 
Similar to the old process, POM development received fiscal 
guidance from SECNAV and SPPs from resource sponsors. The 
SPPs were evaluated and presented at the post SPP 
assessment for the "end game" review. 
During the internal review, the 1R3B briefed the 
Executive Steering Committee (ESC), chaired by the CNO. At 
this review, the CNO was presented with staff versions of 
the SPPs and recommendations from the overall POM 
reviewers. The tentative POM was then formulated for 
delivery to SECNAV. [Ref. 63, p. C-10] 
F. FY 1994 BUDGET 
The OPNAV reorganization and program planning shift 
were seen as a significant changes for the Navy. The 
fiscal year 1994 Navy budget was the first in a series of 
budgets that shifted naval operations from deep-water blue 
to littoral green. A Senate Armed Services Committee staff 
member commented on the fiscal year 1994 hearings, saying: 
The Navy finally seemed to have its act together 
on how it fit into the broader scheme of things. 
Just two years ago, it looked like they were still 
trying to do the same things they'd done (during 
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the Cold War), just a little less. [Ref. 66, p. 
167] 
Except for a few changes, legislators embraced the 
Navy's new budget vision. For years, Congress had wanted 
to see steep declines in defense spending in support of 
defici t reduction. They also wanted a logical refocusing 
of forces and equipment from global war with the Soviets to 
the regional threats emerging from the coastlines. The 
Navy finally adapted in 1993 and the fiscal year 1994 Navy 
budget was sold to Congress on the basis of j oint mission 
areas, as opposed to platforms. [Ref. 66, p. 167] 
G. SURFACE COMBATANTS 
The OPNAV reorganization and program planning changes 
affected surface combatants. The head of surface warfare 
was downgraded from a vice admiral to a rear admiral 
position. The highest ranking advocates for surface 
warfare were the commanders (vice admirals) of Surface 
Forces Atlantic and Pacific (SURFLANT and SURFPAC) [Ref. 
67] . 
In addition, the Surface Warfare Division now worked 
for N8 rather than the Vice CNO. The N8 organization was 
designed to eliminate competition between the warfare 
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communities and build a consensus on overall required naval 
capabilities. Surface warfare needed to work together with 
the air and undersea communities for a joint vision. 
The shift to j oint mission area assessments changed 
the appraisal process for surface combatant programs. 
Prior to the shift, surface combatants were evaluated by 
traditional naval warfare capabilities, such as anti-
surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare. The revised 
appraisals required surface combatants to be evaluated in 
new mission areas, such as sea and air superiority, joint 
strike, and littoral warfare. 
This shift required changes to surface combatant 
planning [Ref. 67]. Surface combatants had been justified 
under the old appraisal process, directed towards 
countering the Soviet naval threat. To improve carrier 
battle group capabilities, expensive nuclear propulsion 
plants were introduced to surface combatants beginning in 
the 1960s. In the 1980s, the Navy introduced the Aegis 
combat system and experienced a massive build-up of the 
entire fleet. Now in the 1990s, the Navy needed to defend 
its costly force under new assessment criteria. 
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1. Nuclear-Powered Combatants 
In 1974, Congress passed U. S. Code Title III, 
directing all future surface combatants to be nuclear 
powered for operations with carrier battle groups [Ref. 68, 
p. 110]. A surface combatant needed to have the same speed 
and distance capabilities to successfully escort a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier. The Virginia and California-
class cruisers were built to be nuclear escorts. These 
cruisers were to provide defense to the carriers against 
the Soviet naval and air threat in open-ocean conflicts. 
With the shift in mission focus and new budgetary 
restraints in the 1990s, the cruisers needed their expense 
to be justified differently, especially with the 
operationally cheaper and more capable Ticonderoga-class 
cruisers. The two classes of ships were scheduled for 
costly engineering and combat system upgrades lasting 
through 1995. In the end, all nuclear-powered cruisers 
were decommissioned by 1998 due to expense and limited 
mission capabilities [Ref. 31, p. 4]. 
2. Non-Aegis Combatants 
Spruance-class destroyers and Oliver Hazard Perry-
class frigates are non-Aegis combatants that were designed 
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for narrowly defined Cold War missions. Their limited 
capabilities were not easily translated to the new mission 
area assessments. 
The Spruance-class destroyer was originally builtin 
the 1970s as a specialized anti-submarine ship with only 
limited air defense capabilities. In the 1980s, the 
Spruance-class destroyers were upgraded with Harpoon and 
Tomahawk cruise missiles, providing the ship with anti-ship 
and strike capabilities. [Ref. 68, p. 151] 
In consideration of the new joint mission areas, 
Spruance-class destroyers make a small contribution to the 
Navy's littoral role. Their Tomahawk cruise missiles were 
the main asset for the littoral environment. Due to their 
inferior air capabilities, the Spruances could not 
contribute to theater missile defense. The Spruances' 5-
inch/54-caliber guns were deemed inadequate for littoral 
support. 
The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates were also 
limited in littoral capabilities. These frigates 
constituted the "low" end of the 1970s surface combatant 
design strategy of "high/low" mix. These cheaper escorts 
with reduced capabilities were designed to offset the more 
costly Spruance and Ticonderoga classes, the "high" end of 
97 
the mix. [Ref. 69, p. 84] Their mission was to provide 
limited defense to amphibious and underway replenishment 
groups and convoys crossing the open ocean. 
After the Cold War, the frigates' limited capabilities 
had to be translated into new missions to justify their 
existence. The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates have no 
land attack or theater missile defense capabilities [Ref. 
70]. As of 1998, almost half of the class had been either 
decommissioned or placed in the Naval Reserve Force. The 
remaining frigates have been retained in the fleet, partly 
due to their relatively low operating costs and the need to 
maintain 116 surface combatants in accordance with the 
Quadrennial Defense Review [Ref. 71]. 
3. Aegis Combatants 
The Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke-class Aegis 
combatants are multi-mission ships, intended to protect 
carrier battle groups in the event of global war. Each 
class of ship was designed with the Aegis combat system, 
the most advanced warfare system in the world. The Aegis 
combat system was superb in the traditional naval warfare 
roles of ASW, AAW, and ASUW. 
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The shift in mission assessments required N86 to find 
new justifications for these expensive Cold War designed 
combatants. In the early 1990s, all the Ticonderoga-class 
cruisers had already been purchased, but the Arleigh Burke 
program had just begun. N86 needed to translate the 
Arleigh Burkes' $235 million dollar (FY97) Aegis combat 
system into new mission areas to justify program 
continuation. The Surface Warfare Division has invested 
heavily in programs upgrading the Aegis combat system for 
the littoral environment as discussed in chapter III. 
H. THE NEW ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
In July 1998, the CNO approved a new assessment 
process, replacing the JMA/SAs, called Integrated Warfare 
Archi tectures (IWARs) . The new assessments focus on 
capabili ties rather than platforms for programming. The 
Navy felt that the JMA/SA assessment process had become too 
rigid due to resource sponsors leading the JMA/SA teams. 
The resource sponsors had failed to make the link between 
platforms and capabilities. [Ref. 72] 
The IWARS will direct assessments in five different 
areas of naval warfare -- power projection, air dominance, 
maritime dominance, deterrence, and information 
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superiority. Different missions and weapon systems will 
comprise each of the five architectures. This is intended 
to enable naval leadership to understand the contributions 
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Under the new assessments, N81 will chair the IWAR 
working groups. Each IWAR will be constrained by its Total 
Obligational Authority (TOA). N81 will ensure each IWAR 
working group remains wi thin 100 percent of TOA coverage. 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 illustrate the working groups and TOA 
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Figure 4.11: IWAR Working Groups. Ref. 74. 
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Figure 4.12: lWAR TOA Distribution. Ref. 74. 
At the end of the IWAR review, the CNO will be briefed 
on issues from the assessments. The CNO will then publish 
the CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM). The CPAM will 
summarize the IWARs, describe their impact on naval warfare 
capabili ties, and recommend alternatives. The CPAM will 
replace the Investment Balance Review within the 
programming process. [Ref. 73, p. 40] 
The IWAR assessment process was utilized for the 
fiscal year 2001 POM review. The process is still under 
development and is expected to be fully operational for POM 
2002. [Ref. 72] 
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For surface combatants, the IWAR process may alter the 
future shipbuilding plan. The Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer program should not be affected due to its multi-
year procurement strategy. However, the DD-21 program is 
expected to start in 2004 and will have to compete for the 
limited TOA funding with the next generation carrier 
(CVNX), submarine (NSSN), and amphibious (LPD-17) ships. 
I. SUMMARY 
" ... From the Sea" established a new post-Cold War 
direction for the Navy, i.e., joint littoral warfare. 
Admiral Kelso initiated the OPNAV staff reorganization to 
reduce the competition between the warfare communities and 
to increase participation by the CINCs and Marine Corps. 
In addition, the appraisals for the program planning 
process were shifted to joint mission and support area 
assessments. A new board, the IR3B, was established to 
promote consensus in the programming process. 
Surface combatant planning was affected by the OPNAV 
and programming changes. The Surface Warfare Division, 
along with the other warfare divisions, was downgraded and 
transferred to N8' s direction. Surface warfare lost some 
of its autonomy in program planning. 
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The new joint mission area assessments changed the way 
surface combatants were evaluated. Surface combatant 
programs needed to be justified in accordance with new 
mission areas to be funded in the POM. 
For future programming, the new IWAR process began in 
1998. The shift to capability assessments and 100 percent 
TOA coverage may have dramatic effects on the DD-21 program 
in the coming fiscal years. 
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v. DEFENSE REVIEWS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Due to Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe in 
1989 and political reform in the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
U.S. military lost its 40-year-old Cold War adversary. 
Absent this adversary, and the related threat of global 
war, Congress questioned the level of Defense spending. 
The persistence of the deficit reinforced these concerns. 
From 1989 through 1997, 000 conducted an almost continuous 
assessment of force structure and strategy for the post-
Cold War environment. This chapter explains the three 
major Defense assessments of this era. 
The National Defense Panel, an independent, non-
partisan group, critiqued the last review, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR). Their report and the fiscal year 
1999 Defense budget, the latest budget since the QDR, are 
also explained in this chapter. 
Finally, the effects of these reviews on the entire 
fleet and surface combatants in particular are discussed. 
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B. BASE FORCE 
In March 1989, the Joint Staff acknowledged the 
reduced risk of a deliberate Soviet attack on Western 
Europe and the increased risk of non-Soviet threats in the 
Third World. They also emphasized the need to change 
strategic planning from global war to regional 
contingencies. [Ref. 60, p. 3] 
In September 1989, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) Admiral William J. Crowe signed a new National 
Mili tary Strategy (NMS), replacing the concept of forward 
defense to forward presence due to the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Eastern Europe and the increased probability of 
regional contingencies. Instead of large forward-stationed 
forces, the NMS asserted the need for smaller overseas 
forces and increased periodic deployments. [Ref. 60, p. 3] 
General Colin L. Powell became the CJCS in October 
1989. General Powell brought to the Joint Staff a new 
strategic vision for the u.s. military. Due to the changes 
in the Soviet military defense posture and budgetary 
pressures from Congress for a "peace dividend," the new 
chairman believed the u.S. military needed to initiate 
significant force reductions. He felt that if DoD did not 
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commence the process, Congress would dictate deep cuts and 
possibly create a "hollow force," similar to the post-
Vietnam drawdown in the 197 Os. [Ref. 60] For this new 
environment, CJCS General Powell regarded his principal 
challenge as the reshaping of the military. 
The force structure that the Joint Staff and General 
Powell developed was called the Base Force. The term "Base 
Force" was used to assert the minimum force feasible to 
respond to U. S. interests . General Powell felt that any 
. number below the Base Force would endanger u.s capabilities 
to reconstitute in the event of a reemergent Soviet threat. 
Using the authority granted to his position by the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,1 General Powell submitted the 
Base Force plan to SECDEF and the President, circumventing 
the services' POM process [Ref. 60]. The administration 
adopted the Base Force plan in June 1990 and later 
established the DPG in accordance with the plan. The Base 
Force was organized into four packages. These packages 
were not meant to be a blueprint for a new command 
structure, I but a planning tool for sizing the military. 
Table 5.1 lists the four packages. 
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Table 5.1: Base Force Packages. Ref. 75. 
Packages Army Air Force MEF* Carrier s** 
Divisions Wings 
Atlantic 13 16 2 6 
Pacific 2 3.5 1 6 
Contingency 5 7 1 0 
Total 20 26.5 4 12 
ICBMs * SLBMs* Bombers 
Strategic 500 432 99 
* MEF - Marine Expeditionary Force, ICBM - Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile, SLBM - Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missile. 
** The Navy would be reduced to 435 ships, including 143 
surface combatants. 
Active duty personnel were to be reduced to 1,626,000, 
a 25 percent drop from the 1987 peak. Table 5.2 lists the 
Base Force active duty end strength goals. 
IThe 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
made the Chairman, rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal 
military adviser to the President and SECDEF. 
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Table 5.2: Base Force Active Duty End Strength. Ref. 75. 
Service 1990 I 1997 
Army 750,600 536,000* 
Air Force 539,300 430,000 
Navy 582,900 501,000 
Marine Corps 196,700 159,000 
* Required by 1995. 
General Powell asserted that the Base Force was 
structured with anticipated changes in the international 
environment. The Base Force was grounded on four 
assumptions about the future [Ref. 75, p. 3]: 
• The U. S. would see continued arms reductions and 







democratic states would 
heightened by weapons 
proliferation, would continue in areas of great 
concern to the u.S. 
• The U.S. would not have to undertake any 
significant commitment of forward-deployed forces. 
III 
The Base Force was designed to employ decisive power 
in a major regional conflict (MRC) in one part of the world 
and still have sufficient forces for a second regional 
conflict. [Ref. 76] The Base Force was the start of 
military force structuring to win two MRCs. 
The Base Force received criticism due to its two MRC 
concept and assumptions. In a 1993 report, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) questioned the nature of the two 
MRCs. Neither the scope, detail, nor locations were 
specified in the 1992 NMS. Also, two of the four 
assumptions for the Base Force were challenged due to the 
aborted Soviet coup and Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 
1991. [Ref. 75] Wi th these criticisms and a new 
administration in 1993, the Base Force was shelved and the 
military force structure was reappraised in 1993. 
C. BOTTOM-UP REVIEW 
Presidential candidate Bill Clinton campaigned in the 
fall of 1992 to cut Defense spending by an additional $60 
billion over five years from President Bush's plan. Upon 
assuming the presidency, he increased the cuts to $104 
billion from the 1995 to 1999 Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP). [Ref. 77] 
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In March 1993, the new Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
initiated a reassessment of u.s. Defense requirements in a 
report called the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The review was 
completed in seven months, within time for the fiscal year 
1995 budget and FYDP. [Ref. 78, p. 16] 
The BUR outlined four new dangers facing u.s. 
interests in the post-Cold War environment [Ref. 78, p. 
16] : 
• Proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction 
• Threat of large-scale aggression by maj or regional 
powers with opposing interests 
• Failure of democracy and reform in the former Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere 
• Economic dangers to national security 
The BUR asserted that regional aggression was the 
primary threat to U. S. interests. The report specified 
three strategies to counter this danger [Ref. 78, p. 17]: 
• Defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts. 
• Maintain a presence overseas to deter conflicts and 
provide regional stability. 
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• Conduct smaller-scale intervention operations, such 
as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and 
disaster relief. 
Similar to the Base Force, the BUR justified a force 
structure sufficient to fight and win two major regional 
conflicts that occurred nearly simultaneously. Using the 
two MRC strategy, the BUR determined the specific forces, 
capabili ties, and improvements required for the military. 
[Re f. 78, p. 17] 
This force structure reduced active duty forces to 
1.42 million, a drop from the Base Force's 1.6 million in 
1992. DoD believed that a two MRC capable force would 
deter a second aggressor from attacking neighbors while the 
U.S. was engaged in another conflict. This force strategy 
also prepared the U.S. against any future larger-than-
expected threat. [Ref. 78, p. 18] 
force structure. 
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Table 5.3 lists the BUR 
Table 5.3: BUR Force Structure. Ref. 78. 
Force Requirement 
Army 10 active divisions 
15 National Guard combat brigades 
Navy 11 active aircraft carriers 
1 reserve/training aircraft carrier 
45-55 attack submarines 
127 surface combatants 
Total of 346 ships 
Marine Corps 3 MEFs 
Air Force 13 active fighter wings 
7 reserve fighter wings 
Up to 184 bombers 
Strategic nuclear 18 ballistic missile submarines 
forces Up to 94 B-52H bombers* 
20 B-2 bombers* 
500 Minuteman III ICBMs 
* Included within the Air Force 184 bombers. 
Compared to President Clinton's target of $104 
billion, Secretary Aspin determined that the BUR force 
structure would save $91 billion over the 1995 FYDP. 
Secretary Aspin believed an additional $13 billion would be 
. saved through DoD's base closures, acquisition and 
strategic reviews, and the Vice President's National 
Performance Review. [Ref. 79, p. 107] 
Upon Congressional request, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) conducted a review of the BUR and determined 
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that u.s. forces would not be able to support two 
simul taneous MRCs. They doubted the ability of forces to 
redeploy between two conflicts, the availability of 
strategic lift and support forces, and the deployability of 
Army National Guard combat brigades. [Ref. 78, p. 22] 
In addition, Congress established the Commission on 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to determine the 
appropriateness of roles, missions and funtions of the 
military. The Commission recommended that 000 conduct a 
comprehensi ve strategy and force review at the start of 
each new administration or every four years. [Ref. 78, p. 
16 ] 
D. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 
Responding to the Commission's recommendations, 
Congress included within the National Defense Authorization 
Act of 1997 a requirement that two separate defense reviews 
be conducted in 1997. The reviews were the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, conducted by 000, and the National Defense 
Panel Review, conducted by an independent, nonpartisan 
panel, comprised of national security experts outside the 
military. 
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In May 1997, DoD completed the QDR. DoD asserted that 
the QDR was a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and 
affordable plan for defense needs through 2015. The QDR 
was a comprehensive examination of defense strategy, force 
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, and 
active, guard, and reserve forces. The review considered 
anticipated technologies by 2005 and the changes in 
doctrine and operational concepts due to the new 
technology. [Ref. 80, p. 16] 
Seven panels comprised of members from OSD, the Joint 
Staff, CINCs, and the services conducted the review. To 
assess force structure and strategy, the panels [Ref. 80, 
p. 3]: 
• Conducted an assessment that modeled two major 
overlapping wars on the Korean Peninsula and in the 
Arabian Gulf. 
• Examined the results of a smaller-scale contingency 
operations assessment 
• Led an assessment of U. S. capabilities to counter a 
great power in 2014. 
• Conducted an overseas presence analysis. 
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• Reviewed modernization programs to ensure new 
capabilities supported the CJCS' Joint Vision 2010. 
From these assessments, the QDR cited a new strategy, 
consisting of three elements - shape, respond, and prepare 
[Ref. 81]: 
• Shape the strategic environment by deploying forces. 
• Respond to a full spectrum of military operations 
ranging from deterring aggression and conducting 
concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to 
fighting and winning two major regional conflicts. 
• Prepare for an uncertain future by responding to new 
emerging threats, including the potential emergence 
of a regional great power, by investing in force 
modernization, exploiting advanced technologies, and 
reengineering infrastructure and support activities. 
To support the shape, respond and prepare strategy, 
the QDR proposed a force similar to the BUR, but slightly 
smaller. Table 5.4 lists the force structure for the QDR. 
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Table 5.4: QDR Force Structure. Ref. 81. 
Force Requirement 
Army 10 active divisions 
15 National Guard combat brigades 
Navy 11 active aircraft carriers 
1 reserve/training aircraft carrier 
50 attack submarines 
116 surface combatants 
Total of 330 ships 
Marine Corps 3 MEFs 
Air Force 12 active fighter wings 
8 reserve fighter wings 
187 bombers 
Strategic Nuclear 18 ballistic missile submarines 
Forces 71 B-52H bombers* 
21 B-2 bombers* 
500 Minuteman III ICBMs 
* Included wlthin the Air Force 187 bombers. 
The QDR asserted that the force was shaped to meet 
demands in the near term and long term strategy [Ref. 81]. 
The five year funding plan aimed at both preserving current 
forces and investing in future weapons systems. 
The QDR set a procurement funding goal of $60 billion 
by fiscal year 2001. Secretary of Defense William Cohen 
believed that Defense budgets would remain relatively flat 
at $250 billion (FY97 dollars). Wi th no real growth in 
Defense spending, the Secretary needed to produce savings 
in the budget in order to boost procurement. The QDR set 
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an 1.36 million goal for active duty forces, reducing end 
strength by 60,000 from the BUR level. Full-time civilian 
employees were to be cut by 80,000. The QDR also 
recommended two more rounds of base closures in 1999 and 
2001. Along with changes to some weapon systems 
procurement plans, these savings would total over $10 
billion for recaptilization programs. [Ref. 82, p. 8] 
The GAO examined the 1998 FYDP resulting from the QDR. 
They determined that this budget was unlikely to be 
executed as planned. The 1998 FYDP relied on billions of 
dollars in savings from unspecified management initiatives. 
The plan also proj ected no real growth in Defense health 
care, a program that had increased 73 percent from 1985 to 
1996. [Ref. 83, p. 3] 
The six year funding for procurement and O&M ran 
counter to DoD's experience over the last 30 years. Since 
1965, O&M funding has increased consistently with growth in 
procurement funding. Historically, procurement funding 
rose and fell in correlation to the total Defense budget. 
Shattering this historical trend, the 1998 FYDP proj ected 
procurement funding to rise 29 percent while O&M and total 
Defense funding remained relatively flat in real growth. 
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[Ref. 84, p. 9] Table 5.5 lists O&M, procurement, and total 
Defense TOA from the 1998 FYDP. 
Table 5.5: O&M, Procurement, and Total Defense TOA from the 
1998 FYDP (Current Dollars). Ref. 11. 
Title FY98 FY99 FYOO FY01 FY02 FY03 
O&M 94.2 94.6 95.7 97.7 99.5 101.7 
% Real growth 0.0 -1.4 -1.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 
Procurement 45.1 48.7 54.1 61. 3 60.7 63.5 
% Real Growth 2.9 6.2 9.2 11.1 -2.9 2.6 
Total Budget 256.8 258.6 264.0 272.3 275.5 285.1 
% Real Growth -1.2 -1. 3 -0.1 0.9 -1.1 1.1 
In late September 1998, the service chiefs, testifying 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, admitted that 
the 1999 FYDP funding was insufficient and readiness was in 
danger. The service chiefs said that they needed up to $17 
billion more each year to repair and replace aging 
equipment, and to buy new ships, aircraft, tanks, and other 
weapons. In an effort to support the 1997 balanced budget 
agreement, the services had remained silent on the need for 
more funding. [Ref. 85] 
Congress agreed to a $9 billion "emergency" supplement 
for the fiscal year 1999 Defense budget. The increase was 
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directed to fund continuing Bosnian operations, year 2000 
fixes, drug interdiction operations, theater missile 
defense, and counter-terrorism activities. Both the Senate 
and the House refused to submit any legislation authorizing 
more base closings. [Ref. 86] Base closures were one of 
the QDR's savings initiatives for increased procurement 
funding. 
As previously reported by the GAO in 1997, the FY99 
budget highlighted the problems with the Defense FYDP. O&M 
was underfunded compared to Defense requirements. With a 
shortage in O&M resources,. unrealistic Defense budgetary 
savings, and flat growth in Defense funding, there were 
substantial risks that procurement funding would not reach 
$60 billion by 2001. 
E. NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL REVIEW 
The National Defense Panel examined the QDR and 
reported in December 1997. The Panel asserted that 
challenges between 1997 and 2020 would require fundamental 
changes to national security institutions, military 
strategy, and defense posture. To fund the transformation, 
the Panel estimated that the military needed to spend $5 to 
$10 billion a year. [Ref. 87] 
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The Panel believed that future mission types would 
remain largely unchanged but with a different emphasis. 
According to the Panel, U.S. missions and capabilities for 
the 2010 to 2020 time frame would include [Ref. 87]: 
• Maintaining regional 








• Projecting more shore-based land and air forces to 
places where the U.S. may not have forward-deployed 
forces or forward bases. 
• Protecting the U. S. against nuclear, chemical, ' 
biological, and information warfare. 
• Shifting nuclear deterrence to tracking the 
proliferation of mass destruction weapons. 
• Integrating information technology into offensive 
and defensive capabilities. 
For future threats, homeland defense and weapons of 
mass destruction were emphasized by the panel. The panel 
believed that terrorists or nations using mass destruction 
weapons would threaten the coasts and borders of the United 
States. [Ref. 88] 
123 
The Panel also believed that the QDR's two MRC force 
structuring plan was flawed. The report asserted that the 
probabili ty of two MRCs was highly unlikely and that it 
served only to justify the current force. Preparing for 
the two nearly simultaneously MRCs, the U. S. wasted near-
term resources that should be invested for long-term 
security. The report insisted that procurement programs 
supported Cold War systems not in accordance with the 
future capabilities envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. 
Unlike the QDR, the National Defense Panel Review did 
not specify force structure. Instead the Panel recommended 
force capability objectives. The panel asserted that 
future conventional forces should build [Ref. 87, p. 44]: 
• Systems architectures to enable network-based 
operations 
• Defenses for our commercial and military information 
architectures 
• Electronic strike arsenals, e.g., virus insertion 
and electromagnetic pulse capabilities 
• Automated systems 
• Smaller and more mobile logistics capabilities 
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• Improved sea and air lift to employ forces rapidly 
and with the correct configuration 
• Steathy air, sea, and ground forces 
• Long-range precision strike weapons 
The Panel gave specific examples for actions to 
transform the military to meet the challenges of the 
future. The actions that applied to surface combatants 
were [Ref. 87, p. 46]: 
• Provide long-range precision cruise missiles 
• Integrate ballistic and cruise missile defense in 
the littoral 
• Accelerate network centric operations linking 
sensors and weapons 
• Plan less manpower-intensive forces 
• Build small-signature ships capable of providing 
sustained long-range firepower 
• Design ship production to allow rapid incorporation 
of the latest technology 
Applying these principles and future visions of the 
military, the Panel questioned some of the services' 
procurement programs. For the surface navy, the Panel 
disagreed with the decision to terminate the Arsenal Ship. 
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They believed that this platform was an important test bed 
to support new maj or naval weapon systems and concepts. 
[Re f. 87, p. 49} 
F. TRENDS IN DEFENSE REVIEWS 
The maj or Defense reviews of the post-Cold War era 
sought to match strategy, force structure, and proj ected 
budget resources. Each review was cri tici zed for being 
driven by budgets rather threats. 
From fiscal years 1991 through 1998, the reviews 
established the DPG and enabled a 29 percent drawdown of 
acti ve duty personnel, 35 percent since the peak in 1987 
[Ref. 11, Table 7-5]. Figure 5.1 illustrates the reduction 
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Figure S.l: FY90-98 Active Duty End Strengths. Ref. 11. 
G. BATTLE FORCE SHIPS 
By 1998, the post-Cold War reviews, in conjunction 
wi th the other developments treated in this thesis, had 
gradually reduced the Navy to 331 ships, a 44 percent drop 
compared to 1989. The fleet is projected to drop to 321 in 
1999 and possibly below 300 in following years. [Ref. 88] 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition commented that the fleet size 
emerging from the QDR was the \\ smallest it's been since 
1921." [Ref. 89, p. 26] 
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In the 1990s, the fleet downsizing was accomplished by 
decommissioning a large number of old and middle-aged ships 
and building a smaller number of new ships. In order to 
maintain the QDR force, the shipbuilding rate must be 
increased from six to seven ships per year to eight to ten 
per year. As new construction is delayed, a shipbuilding 
"bow wave u is created in future years' procurement in order 
to replenish the fleet. [Ref. 90] 
the decline in fleet strength. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates 
Due to the drawdown and shipbuilding priorities, the 
force structure has shifted slightly to littoral 
operations. Coastal patrol, amphibious and mine warfare 
ships have increased from 14.6 to 23.3 percent of the 
fleet. This increase was partly due to the littoral 
shipbuilding programs in the 1990s. Surface combatants and 
submarines maintained approximately the same percentage and 
Auxiliaries declined since 1989. [Ref. 88] Figure 5.3 
illustrates the trend in fleet composition by percentage 
since 1989. 
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Figure 5.3: FY89-98 Fleet Composition by Percentage (FY99 
is projected). Ref. 87. 
H. SURFACE COMBATANTS 
The Reagan Defense build-up of the early 1980s set a 
goal of 238 surface combatants. In 1987, surface 
combatants reached their peak of 220 ships [Ref. 88]. With 
the threat of global war diminished, surface combatants 
became prime targets for downsizing in the 1990s. The 
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Defense reviews shaped the surface combatant fleet, guided 
by force structure and manpower goals and force concepts. 
1. Force Structure 
The 1990 Base Force and 1993 BUR established a DPG 
calling for 150 and 128 surface combatants, respectively. 
Both reviews concentrated on aircraft carriers for planning 
purposes, from which surface combatant levels were derived. 
The 1997 QDR specifically targeted surface combatants 
due to "newer and more capable" ships being added to the 
fleet. [Ref. 81, p. 29] 000 set a goal of 116 surface 
combatants to compensate for an increased number of multi-
mission Aegis combatants. When surface combatant levels 
reach 116 in 1999, Aegis ships are projected to be 47 
percent of the surface combatant fleet [Ref. 27]. 
The post-Cold War reviews progressively reduced the 
recommended number of surface combatants. To meet force 
level goals, the Navy decommissioned ships prior to the end 
of their service lives. Delaying new ship production also 
reduced surface combatant levels. Figure 5.4 illustrates 
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Figure 5.4: FY89-99 Surface Combatants (FY99 is projected). 
Ref. 88. 
The levels established by these reviews conflicted 
with the 1995 Surface Combatant Force Level Study, 
sponsored by N86. The study cited the need for 165 surface 
c.ombatants in a two MRC scenario. With maximum allied 
support projected at 30 warships, the study concluded that 
135 u. s. surface combatants were required. To alleviate 
the risk of inadequate allied support, the study 
recommended 135 active duty combatants combined with 10 
reserve frigates. [Ref. 91] 
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The force mix of the 145 ships was to be composed of 
80 Aegis and 65 non-Aegis combatants. [Ref. 
the reduced procurement rate of Arleigh 
91] Due to 
Burke-class 
destroyers, the Aegis fleet will not attain that level 
before 2005 [Ref. 92]. 
With the QDR establishing the 1998 DPG at 116 surface 
combatants, the Surface Warfare Division's recommendation 
of 145 was apparently rej ected. The QDR did acknowledge 
the increasing percentage of multi-mission Aegis combatants 
and reduced the overall surface combatant levels. 
2. Manpower 
The types of surface combatants decommissioned were 
partly influenced by end strength goals established by the 
reviews. Steam and nuclear-powered ships were manpower 
intensi ve platforms. Their engineering plants and older 
weapon systems required more personnel to maintain and 
operate them. 
In 1990, the Navy had 95 steam and nuclear-powered 
surface combatants. By 1998, the surface combatant fleet 
had almost 24,000 fewer billets due to the decommissioning 
of all steam and nuclear surface combatants. [Ref. 27] 
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Table 5.6 compares manpower requirements of the older steam 
and nuclear platforms against gas turbine platfor ms. 
Table 5.6: Surface Combatant Manpower Requir aments. Ref. 
27. 
Surface Combatants Officers a nd Crew 
Nuclear 
Long Beach-class cruiser 958 
Truxton-class cruiser 561 
Bainbridge-class cruiser 558 
Virginia-cruiser 624 
California-class cruiser 603 
Steam 
Belknap-class cruiser 479 
Leahy-class cruiser 423 
Coontz-class destroyer 402 
Charles F. Adams-class destroyer 360 
Knox-class frigate 288 
Gas Turbine 
Ticonderoga-class cruiser 358 
Spruance-class destroyer 339 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer 346 
Kidd-class destroyer 339 
Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate 206 
3. Force Concepts 
The Defense reviews changed strategic pla nning from 
global war to major regional conflicts. To co ntribute to 
MRCs, the role for surface combatants was shift ed from war 
at sea to littoral operations. 
The National Defense Panel advocated fu ture force 
capabilities to ensure security in the next cen tury. The 
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Navy has been pursuing these capabilities with the Navy 
Theater Missile Defense system, increased and more precise 
power projection, and the 00-21 ship program. 
Wi th the unexpected North Korean launch of a three-
stage rocket in September 1998, homeland defense and the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles have become national 
priorities [Ref. 93]. In the fiscal year 1999 budget, 
Congress appropriated an extra $1 billion for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to accelerate 
,development of ballistic missile defense systems. In an 
October 21, 1998 letter, a bipartisan group of Senators 
urged Secretary of Defense Cohen to spend a large portion 
of the extra $1 billion on the Navy Theater Missile Defense 
system. The Senators cited the Navy program's "level of 
success" and "possibility for near-term protection" as 
justification. [Ref. 94, p. 1] 
Two cruisers are.scheduled to field an area ballistic 
missile defense system by September 1999 for testing and/or 
national emergencies [Ref. 95, p.38]. With increased 
funding, Navy theater wide defense could be deployed by 
2005, according to the Navy's Theater Air Defense Branch. 
000 asserted that Navy theater wide defense is an important 
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element for National Missile Defense, a program designed to 
protect the territorial u.s. [Ref. 96, p. 1]. 
I. SUMMARY 
The collapse of the Soviet threat and budgetary 
pressures were catalysts for change to the U. S. military 
strategy and force structure. DoD coordinated that change 
by conducting comprehensive reviews of the military. These 
reviews were the 1990 Base Force, the 1993 BUR, and the 
1997 QDR. Collectively, these reviews reduced DoD end 
strength by 29 percent. For the Navy, the reviews cut 44 
percent of the fleet. 
As part of the fleet, surface combatants were also 
reduced. The reviews directed surface combatant reductions 
in part by setting overall Navy manpower goals and force 
levels and by advancing new concepts in naval warfare. To 
meet the DPG established by the Defense reviews, the 
surface combatant fleet was reduced by 104 ships and over 
24,000 billets. The Navy also shifted its focus to 
littoral operations to support the MRC strategy. 
The services have experienced funding difficulties in 
meeting the force objectives established by the latest 
Defense review, the QDR. This was reflected in critiques 
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of the 1998 and 1999 FYOPs. GAO argued that these budgets 
have substantial risk in implementation. The GAO 
considered the procurement goals as unrealistic and O&M as 
underfunded. By September 1998, the service chiefs 
apparently agreed, testifying to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that Oefense funding was insufficient and 
readiness was at risk. 
Future shortages in O&M and procurement funding may 
al ter surface combatant shipbuilding programs. Under the 
mUlti-year contract, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer 
procurement rate should not change. However, since 00-21 
procurement is scheduled to begin in 2004, this surface 
combatant program may be altered due to other competing 
shipbuilding programs and the lack of procurement funding. 
Homeland defense and Navy theater wide missile defense 
have become more important, and, accordingly, have received 
increased funding. Wi th the fiscal year 1999 addition of 
$1 billion for the BMOO, the Navy may experience an 
accelerated development of ballistic missile defense and, 





This thesis identified and examined the most important 
factors that influenced planning for the U.S. surface 
combatant fleet since the end of the Cold War. 
addressed the following subsidiary questions. 
It also 
• What trends are perceived in surface combatant force 
levels since the end of the Cold War? 
• How have the major deficit reduction agreements of the 
1990s affected Defense, and, in turn, surface combatants? 
• How was the surface combatant force restructured in DoD's 
"Base Force" (1990), "Bottom-Up Review" (1993) and the 
"Quadrennial Defense Review" (1997)? 
• How did the OPNAV staff reorganization and the new 
assessment process in 1993 modify programming. for surface 
combatants? 
• How has littoral warfare changed surface combatant 
planning? 
To interpret the changes to surface combatant 
planning, this summary divides the conclusions into factors 
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that shaped the present force and factors that will 
influence the future force. 
1. Major Factors 1990 to 1998 
Two major factors, the end of the Cold War and tight 
limits on discretionary spending, have shaped surface 
combatant planning from 1990 to 1998. These two catalysts 
transformed surface combatant doctrine and force structure. 
a. End of the Cold War 
By the end of 1989, the Eastern European nations 
had left the Soviet Bloc and renounced their ties to 
Moscow. In December 1991, President Gorbechev resigned as 
Soviet President and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
was created in the former Soviet Union. These two events 
eliminated the United States' Cold War adversary. The 
threat of global war and the justification for the Reagan 
Defense build-up were removed. In response, the U.S. 
shifted from preparing for global war to preparing for 
major regional conflicts. 2 
2The 1998 Defense Posture Statement and National Military Strategy have 
changed this term to Major Theater Wars. 
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b. Discretiona~ Spending Limits 
With reform in Eastern Europe and spiraling 
federal deficits and debt, deficit reduction took 
precedence in the post-Cold War era. In 1990, the 
government changed its budgetary strategy from the deficit 
targets of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to limiting spending. 
Spending limits were enforced as caps on discretionary 
and pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) for entitlement spending 
programs. The BEA's discretionary spending limits achieved 
the majority of their deficit reductions by reducing 
Defense spending. From 1990 to 1998, Defense TOA dropped 
from $363.4 to $262.0 billion (FY99 dollars), losing 28 
percent of its spending authority [Ref. 11]. 
2. Effects on Surface Combatants 
These two catalysts, the shift in Defense strategy and 
r,eduction in fiscal resources , altered the structure of the 
U.S. military. DoD attempted to develop new strategies and 
reduce resources in three Defense wide reviews, the Base 
Force, BUR, and QDR. These reviews downsized end strength 
and force structure to meet budgetary goals and new 
strategic planning objectives. 
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Since 1989, the Navy's share of the DoD downsizing was 
a 35 percent drop in active duty end strength and a 44 
percent reduction in the fleet. Navy TOA declined 33.5 
percent from 1990 to 1998 [Ref. 11]. O&M and procurement 
plummeted and the Cold War fleet was no longer affordable. 
For surface combatants, this new regionally focused 
strategy and the restricted resources provided to achieve 
it progressively reduced requirements from 238 in 1988 to 
116 in 1998. In addition, surface combatants with large 
. manpower requirements were targeted for elimination in 
order to meet DPG end strength goals. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the trend between Navy procurement and O&M and 
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Figure 6.1: FY86-99 Surface Combatant Force Levels, Navy 
O&M and Procurement TOA (FY99 Dollars). Ref. 11 and 88. 
To manage the transformation of strategy and the new 
fiscal environment in the DoN, eNO Admiral Kelso provided a 
new vision for naval warfare and restructured the Navy's 
.planning process. The new naval vision was published in 
" ... From the Sea," detailing the use of naval forces for 
joint littoral warfare. The new white paper dictated that 
naval doctrine, organization, and weapon capabilities were 
to be designed to influence events ashore in support of 
joint operations. 
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To realize these new naval concepts, Admiral Kelso 
reorganized the OPNAV Staff and program planning process. 
The reorganization reduced competition between the warfare 
communi ties and increased participation by the CINCs and 
Marine Corps. The change in program planning to joint 
mission and support area assessments incorporated new 
standards and criteria for determining program priori ties 
in the new j oint strategic environment. With the 
implementation of the new OPNAV and program planning, 
Admiral Kelso was able to lead the Navy to the new 
direction of joint littoral warfare. 
Wi th a new OPNAV Staff and program planning process, 
the surface combatant fleet was transformed from expensive 
Cold War battlegroups to more affordable joint littoral 
forces. This restructuring of the fleet in the post-Cold 
War strategic and fiscal environment was accomplished by 
n€w weapons development and revolutionary ship concepts. 
The smaller and less expensive surface combatant fleet 
emerging from this transformation is focused on the 
littoral. The Cold War inspired Aegis combatants are being 
upgraded to dominate the littoral battlespace and to 
increase power projection ashore in support of joint ground 
operations. The next surface combatant program, DD-21, is 
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specifically designed to operate in the littoral and 
provide enhanced land attack capabilities. 
The Navy force structure has become more economical by 
reducing operating and procurement costs for surface 
combatants. All the manpower intensive steam and nuclear 
surface combatants have been decommissioned. For the 
present shipbuilding program, the Navy entered into a four 
year multi-year contract for 14 Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers, projected to save $1.4 billion [Ref. 36]. The 
Ticonderoga-class cruisers will commence a weapons system 
upgrade in 2001, extending their useful life and delaying a 
new cruiser program until 2015 [Ref. 34, p. 26]. For the 
new surface combatant program, the design of DD-21 is 
focused on reduced life cycle costs through automation, 
improved maintenance technologies, and optimizing manning 
functions. With its operations, maintenance, and upgrades 
projected to cost a third as much as a conventional 
destroyer, DD-21 will be a significantly reduced burden on 
the Navy's limited resources. 
3. Major Factors for the Future 
From 1990 to 1998, surface combatant planning was 
shaped by the strategic shift after the Cold War and limits 
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on discretionary spending. For the future, the tight 
fiscal environment and the new interest in regional and 
homeland security will shape the surface combatant force. 
s. FUture Budgets 
Starting in fiscal year 2000, the "firewalls" 
separating Defense and non-Defense spending will be 
eliminated as per the Balanced Budget Agreement of 1997. 
The only limit will be on total discretionary (and violent 
crime) spending for the fiscal year 2000 budget. The 
fiscal years 2001 and 2002 budgets will have a single cap 
on overall discretionary spending. Wi th these budgetary 
changes, Defense will have to compete for limited funds 
against domestic programs. The old debate of "guns vs. 
butter" will resume. [Ref. 97, p.28] 
FYDP. 
For Defense, fueling this debate will be the 
At the end of the debate over the fiscal year 1999 
budget, the service chiefs requested an extra $17 billion a 
year for Defense to address readiness deficiencies [Ref. 
85] . The service chiefs asserted that the relatively flat 
Defense budgets of the 1998 FYDP are inadequate to meet the 
magnitude of Defense requirements, ranging from peace 
keeping operations to weapons recaptilization. 
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Within a confined Defense budget of $250 billion, 
the 1998 FYDP depended on nearly flat O&M funding and 
increased infrastructure savings to boost the procurement 
accounts to $60 billion by 2001 [Ref. 11]. Historically, 
O&M funding grew as procurement increased and procurement 
rose and fell with overall Defense budgets [Ref. 84]. To 
add to the financial risks of the 1998 FYDP, Congress has 
been unwilling to support further base realignments and 
closures to promote infrastructure savings, despite the QDR 
and National Defense Panel recommendations. 
For fiscal year 2000, the Defense budget will 
have some stiff competition for additional funding. A 
federal budget surplus is projected, but numerous 
initiatives are competing for funding. For example, 
Democratic ini tiati ves have been proposed for the surplus 
to improve education. Republican initiatives have been 
directed towards tax cuts. Both parties want to shore up 
Social Security before the baby boom generation begins to 
retire in 2008. [Ref. 97, p. 28] In the end, domestic 
ini tiati ves and the lack of discretionary "firewalls" may 
make increased spending for DoD's 2000 FYDP difficult to 
accomplish. 
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For surface combatants, the fiscal year 2000 FYDP 
will be crucial. Seven different shipbuilding programs are 
scheduled during the 2000 FYDP. In fiscal year 2004, seven 
ships are to be purchased, including the first DD-21 [Ref. 
98] . With the new IWAR assessment process and its 
requirement for 100 percent TOA coverage, it may be 
difficult for the Surface Warfare Division to complete the 
32 DD-21s by 2015 within a constrained procurement TOA. 
b. Regional and Homeland Security 
With weapons of mass destruction proliferating, 
theater missile defense has become a priority for regional 
stability and homeland defense [Ref. 87]. Southwest Asia 
and the Middle East are regions susceptible to instability 
due to ballistic missile proliferation. Fearing North 
Korea and China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have 
expressed interest in a joint effort with the u. S. for 
building a theater missile defense system [Ref. 99]. 
Israel and the u.S. are already in the process of 
purchasing a third Arrow theater missile defense system to 
protect Israel from any potential Iranian, Iraqi or Syrian 
ballistic missile attacks [Ref. 94, p. 1]. Due to the 
increasing number of countries with ballistic missile 
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capabilities, theater missile defense has become an 
instrument for regional stability. 
Closer to home, the Chinese are judged to have at 
least 13 nuclear-armed ballistic missiles aimed at u.s. 
cities [Ref. 93]. North Korea's September 1998 launch of a 
three stage rocket confirmed their ability to reach Hawaii 
or Alaska with ballistic missiles. Due to ballistic 
missile proliferation, th~ National Defense Panel asserted 
that homeland defense will become a priority within the 
next 20 years [Ref. 87]. 
The threats of ballistic missiles against 
regional stability and u.S. territory provide an 
surface combatants to expand their opportunity for 
strategic role. Wi th the extra funding provided to the 
BMDO in fiscal year 1999, the Navy believes that it can 
have a theater wide system operational by as early as 2005 
with a portion of those funds [Ref. 96]. Aegis combatants 
could be deployed to provide regional stability and 
homeland defense against ballistic missiles. 
Insuring regional stability and homeland defense 
would be a tremendous transformation for Aegis combatants. 
With the role of ballistic missile defense, the Aegis 
"shield" would be transformed from protection of naval 
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battlegroups in the Cold War to defending cities in the 
"new world ordern. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR I"t1'1'URE RESEARCH 
This thesis identified and explained the major factors 
that have influenced the Navy's surface combatant fleet in 
the post-Cold War era. Further research should be done on 
the major factors that influenced the Army during this 
transitional period. The Army experienced an even greater 
downsizing and doctrine change after the Cold War. The 
Army's shift in planning from ground war in Europe to major 
regional conflicts would be a useful focus. A similar 
study could be done on the Air Force's transition. 
Of additional interest would be an in depth analysis 
of the new Navy programming process started in June 1998. 
Unsuccessful with the JMA/SA assessments, the IWAR 
appraisal process is expected to emphasis capabilities 
rather than platforms for programming recommendations. 
Analyzing all the factors that influence PPBS, a study 
could examine IWAR's capabilities approach for assessments. 
Finally, the 1998 FYDP relies on infrastructure and 
budgetary assumptions to support an increase to $60 billion 
in procurement funding by 2001. Further research should be 
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conducted on the appropriateness of this funding level and 
Defense recapitilization requirements. 
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